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I. SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND THE COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE
A continuing controversy in the area of tax policy is the correct
categorization of a number of alleged tax expenditures. The issue being
debated is whether certain provisions in the Canadian Income Tax Act' are
deviations from a neutral concept of income or are, in fact, essential
refinements necessary to calculate a taxpayer's true income. Some of the more
interesting and conceptually difficult provisions in the Act are those allowing a
taxpayer to deduct amounts paid as support 2 and, consequently, forcing the
recipient to include the same amounts in his or her income. 3
For over forty years Canadian taxpayers have been able to shift tax liabili-
ty for amounts paid as maintenance or alimony to the recipient spouse or ex-
spouse. Practitioners strive to structure divorce or separation settlements that
will meet the requirements of the provisions which permit the payor to deduct
these amounts from income and which require the recipient to include the
same amounts in his or her income. The types of support payments eligible for
the tax liability transfers have grown over the years as notions of spousal
obligations and appropriate responsibilities have changed. The expanded ap-
plication of the support payments tax transfer provisions has meshed well with
the structure and operation of the earlier provisions. There is little evidence,
however, that the original rationale for the provisions has been considered
when subsequent amendments and additions to these support payments sec-
tions have been enacted. Moreover, in many respects the provisions appear in-
consistent with the application of the general principles upon which the Act is
based.
A proper evaluation of the support payments provisions necessarily
begins with an inquiry into the concept of "income", the cornerstone of any
income tax system. As with many similar statutes in other countries, the Cana-
dian Act makes no attempt to define the concept on which it is based. 4 Only
after it is determined what exactly an income tax seeks to tax can one turn to
support payments and ask whether they are or are not part of the payor's, or
transferor's, income. If they are, the provisions tranferring tax liability on
such amounts are equivalent to a government subsidy of certain support
obligations; if they are not part of his or her income, a deduction to provide
relief from tax liability on these amounts is clearly called for.
This paper consists of two sections. The first part examines the concept of
income as used in the Act. While the study begins with the Haig-Simons 5 for-
' S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, as amended [hereinafter Act].
2 Subsections 56(1)(b) and (c).
3 Subsections 60(b) and (c).4 The main charging section, s. 2(1), simply states, "An income tax shall be paid as
hereinafter required upon the taxable income for each taxation year.. . " a provision
not clarified by the next subsection, s. 2(2), which provides, "The taxable income of a
taxpayer... is his income for the year minus the deductions permitted [elsewhere in the
Act]."
The U.S. Internal Revenue Code provides a partial list of items that are to be included
in income in §61, but the general definition found in the same section states that "gross
income means all income from whatever source derived.. .. "
5 Haig, "The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects," in Haig, ed., The
FederalIncome Tax (New York, 1921) at 54, 59.
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mula, namely income equals consumption. plus increase in net worth, a
number of considerations will be resorted to to give meaning to that definition.
It is useless to try to define income without at the same time asking why we use
the concept as a tax base and, more importantly, as a tax base to which a
graduated rate schedule is applied. An obvious purpose of the income tax
system is to divert a portion of the nation's potential private consumption and
accumulation to public purposes. There remains the question of why an in-
come tax system with graduated tax rates is used to achieve this end. The
answer lies in a goal quite distinct from the purely fiscal concerns of the
government - a desire to appropriate to the state progressively larger por-
tions of taxpayers' incomes. This non-proportional tax burden might be used
to accomplish redistributive functions if coupled with a progressive govern-
ment expenditure programme, or to achieve a relative neutrality of govern-
ment intervention in the market if coupled with a regressive expenditure pro-
gramme. Neither explanation for the graduated tax rates leads inexorably to a
particular definition of income. Ultimately the choice of tax base rests on
one's understanding of the non-fiscal goals of the income tax system. The
history of progressive income taxation in Canada, as well as the basic structure
of the original and replacement acts, suggest that the appropriate definition of
income for the purposes of the Act is one that encompasses a taxpayer's ability
to distribute income, not merely to consume with it.
In the second half of this paper the principles of income and control are
applied to the support transfer provisions. A brief review of the development
of support obligations shows that support has a nebulous character, providing
no clues in its inherent nature as to its appropriate treatment in an ideal per-
sonal income tax.
An examination of the history of our tax treatment of support payments
similarly shows that the present treatment has not evolved from a deliberate
application of income tax principles to this particular type of taxpayer expen-
diture and receipt. Support payments were originally treated as a non-
deductible personal expense of the payor and a non-taxable receipt to the reci-
pient. In the United States, during the Second World War, provision was made
for the transfer of tax liability on such amounts for two reasons. First, there
was concern over the effect of rising tax rates on taxpayers who had settled
their alimony obligations on the basis of their after-tax incomes as calculated
at the pre-war rates. Second, Congress sought to end the inconsistent treat-
ment of taxpayers who had attempted to satisfy their alimony obligations by
establishing alimony trusts only to find the tax consequences of the settlements
turned on the peculiarities of applicable state law. Canada quickly adopted the
changes initiated in the United States despite the fact that the second rationale
for the change in the United States, the desire to achieve a uniform tax treat-
ment of alimony trusts throughout the country, had no application north of
the border. The soundness of that original decision has not been questioned
despite the detailed examination of other areas of income tax theory and prac-
tice that has been undertaken since that time.
An application of the principles of income and control to the provisions
governing the treatment of support payments leads to the conclusion that in a
comprehensive tax base system support should be considered part of the
payor's income and not deserving of relief from tax liability. The effect of the
deduction is to act as a government subsidy for certain transfer payments.
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There is one way in which the transfer of tax liability on support payments
might be justified on tax principle grounds, namely if it were considered a
form of property income - the recipient's return on his or her investment in
the human capital of the payor. This analysis, however, will not stand up to
careful scrutiny in light of the historical justifications for and present nature of
support obligations. On the other hand, applying those same principles to the
treatment of support payments from the recipient's perspective would lead to
the conclusion that such payments should be taxed as income in the hands of
the recipient even though ideally no deduction would be allowed to the payor.
Practical considerations preclude any attempt to tax persons in a family on the
support they receive, however, and equity dictates that support payments
should receive like treatment in the case of recipients who are no longer part of
the payor's household.
Applying a tax expenditure analysis to the provisions shows that the
deduction and re-inclusion provisions are a particularly inappropriate way to
provide public assistance for certain private income transfers or to accomplish
whatever other ends that might be sought through the application of the pres-
ent treatment. The government might well wish to subsidize these income
transfers, and it might seek to do so through the income tax system. It is im-
portant, however, to recognize that in essence it is dealing with a subsidy, not a
refinement of the tax base within the context of a normative tax system. The
provisions adopted to distribute the benefit should take into account its nature
as a subsidy if it is to be equitably distributed. Many models are possible; one
is sketched briefly to illustrate the concerns that should be addressed when
drafting provisions to accomplish an equitable distribution. 6
Political realities and not tax theory must often govern the reform of our
income tax law and, realistically, the fact that the support transfer provisions
are firmly imbedded in our income tax system must be recognized. There is lit-
tle likelihood that we shall return to the pre-1942 treatment of such payments
and it is therefore time to acknowledge the tax expenditure nature of the provi-
sions and ask how they should be modified to best accomplish the non-tax
goals the government seeks to achieve through these tax provisions.
II. INCOME AS A TAX BASE
A. The Elements of Income
The question of which deductions from gross income are appropriate to
calculate taxable income, on which it is fair to base tax liability, has generated
much debate. It is clear that income is not synonomous with receipts - un-
questionably a taxpayer should be permitted to subtract the expenses incurred
to earn gross receipts in arriving at his or her profits; income from a business
cannot exceed net profits. Less clear, however, is the appropriate treatment of
amounts spent on involuntary purchases such as medical expenses, or amounts
transferred to others for their own consumption, such as charitable donations
or support payments.
Resolution of these issues will turn on their evaluation in light of the
operative definition of income used in our income tax; that definition, in turn,
must be based upon the application for which it is intended. When we speak of
6 See text accompanying notes 223, 224, infra.
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income we are referring to its potential, that is, its social utility or ability to
command goods or services in the marketplace. We are not, however, concern-
ed with that ability in a vacuum. It has a quality that we not only wish to tax,
but which we wish to tax at increasingly steeper rates. In addition, we seek to
measure in the hands of certain taxpaying units that ability to which the pro-
gressive tax rates are applied. Thus, the choice of unit is as integral as the rate
structure to the meaning of "income", the base being taxed. The definition
which results from the consideration of the economic ability of income as
measured in the hands of pre-determined tax units, in light of our desire to tax
it at progressive rates, is likely to be very different from the meaning a layper-
son would ascribe to it outside of a tax context.
Take, for example, the taxpayer who gives half of her receipts to a chari-
ty. She would most likely be quite surprised to learn that some persons did not
consider the money she gave away to be her "income". She earned the money;
she made the decision to give it away; she chose the recipient - in almost all
non-tax contexts we would agree with her that this was her income. If income
measures her economic potential to either consume or to give the money to
others to consume, such amounts should also be considered her income for tax
purposes. On the other hand, she might agree with those who assert that it is
inappropriate for her to pay tax on that part of the money she gave away for
others to use. Members of this school would suggest that income for tax pur-
poses means income actually available for the personal consumption of the
taxpayer at the end of the tax period and taxpayers should be relieved of tax
liability on amounts that are earned and then given away so they will not be
used by the initial earner. 7
Once we define the quality of utility that we seek to tax (potential to con-
sume or actual ability to consume after income transfers), it is equally impor-
tant to determine who should be taxed on it. If a charitable donor, support
payor, assignor of income or gift giver belongs to the same taxable unit as the
recipient, it matters little whether the money is taxed in the hands of the giver
or the receiver.
Most important to the proper definition of income is the question of why
we seek to tax it at the progressive rates we do. If income is diverted from one
intended recipient to another, and it would be taxed at the same flat rate in
either party's hands, it is unimportant whether we consider the payment to be
the income of the divertor or divertee. The purpose one attributes to the pro-
gressive rate structure of the income tax system will determine the quality of
utility we wish to tax. The debate might take the form of asking whether
charitable donations or support payments are part of the payor's taxable in-
come. The real question being answered is whether it is appropriate to tax such
amounts at the marginal rates of the payor, or the recipient, or both.
1. Progressive Taxation
Proponents of progressive taxation have long sought to base the
arguments in favour of such a system on rational grounds tied to some in-
7 Professor William Andrews is one of the leading proponents of this view. He
develops the point in his article, PersonalDeductions in an Ideal Income Tax (1972), 86
Harv. L. Rev. 309 at 312.
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herent nature of income itself. 8 This approach was designed to preclude non-
fiscal arguments in favour of such a regime. It has long been evident that tak-
ing increasing portions of money from taxpayers as their incomes grew would
necessarily result in a transfer of amounts to the government and then on to
society as a whole, or that part of society thought to be deserving of the
redistribution. 9 Critics were quick to emphasize the redistributory aspects of
progressive taxation. Its supporters, however, were reluctant to admit that its
effect could also be its aim. 10 Thus, they sought to show that inherent in Adam
Smith's first canon of taxation - each taxpayer should contribute to the
government according to his or her ability I - was a notion that ability rose
geometrically and not arithmetically with income. The thrust of the theories
presented by early supporters of progressive taxation was to demonstrate that
increasing rates were necessary if all taxpayers were to be treated equally. They
sought to prove that a progressive tax system was actually neutral so that the
use of graduated tax rates did not involve differential treatment but, in fact,
subjected all taxpayers to a similar liability.
The superficial attractiveness of a rationale that purported to treat all tax-
payers alike while taxing them at increasingly higher rates proved to be tran-
sitory as critics easily refuted the assumptions upon which each argument was
based.12 Much more persuasive is the rationale based upon the effect of pro-
8A more cynical commentator might suggest that the rationale for increasing
marginal rates is to divert attention from the large loopholes which enable the rich to ef-
fectively avoid a large portion of their tax burden and so appease taxpayers in lower
brackets with the illusion that the rich will be taxed at progressively higher rates. See,
e.g., Whiteman and Wheatcroft, Income Tax and Surtax (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1971) at 9.
9 It is, therefore, no surprise that Marx and Engles made progressive income taxa-
tion an essential platform of the Communist Manifesto. (Marx and Engles, "Manifesto
of the Communist Party," in Marx and Engles, Collected Works (New York: Interna-
tional Publishers, 1976) 476 at 505.) The English editions of the Manifesto called for "a
heavy progressive or graduated income tax" while the German editions wrote only "a
heavy progressive tax."
10 Seligman, for example, suggested that those who supported progressive taxation
as a tool for redistribution were advocating a path of socialism or communism.(Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice (2d ed. American Economic
Assoc., 1908) at 132.) He supported the idea of progressive taxation on other utilitarian
grounds, however, based on the decreasing real cost of production of income, described
infra this section. Other critics were less willing to accept alternative grounds for a pro-
gressive rate structure. See, e.g., Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation (1952), 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 at 489, 180n.
I1 Smith, 2 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed.
Campbell and Skinner (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1976) at 825: "The subjects of every
state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible,
in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which
they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state."
12The seminal work that most effectively dismantles the equal treatment theories
remains Blum and Kalven's The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, supra note 10.
This article was reprinted as a monograph by the University of Chicago in 1953 and as a
book in 1963, the latter containing an introduction to update the work. All references in
this paper are to pages in the original article. For earlier works, see Fagan, Recent and
Contemporary Theories of Progressive Taxation (1938), 46 J. Pol. Econ. 457; Simons,
Personal Income Taxation (Chicago: The U. of Chicago Press, 1938) at 3-16; Kendrick,
The Ability-to-pay Theory of Taxation (1939), 29 Am. Econ. Rev. 92, and for a later
discussion see, "The Troubled Creed of Ability" in Eisenstein, 2 The Ideologies of Tax-
ation (New York: Ronald Press, 1961).
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gressiveness. It is obvious that progressive taxation takes more from the rich
than the poor. If the redistributory effect of progressive taxation is also our
goal, the tax's consequences provide the very justification for its use.
Taxes are designed to appropriate to the state (and through the operation
of its government to the citizenry) a portion of each taxpayer's income. The
common purpose of all tax systems is to transfer economic resources from in-
dividuals to the state so they can be used for public purposes. This could easily
be accomplished by imposing a flat rate of tax. It only makes sense to take in-
creasingly higher proportions from the rich than from the poor if we are seek-
ing to alter the distribution of income while diverting it to the public purse.
The strongest rationale for progressive income taxation is the assertion by its
advocates that it "is the proper means for mitigating inequality." 13 This is the
level on which the progressive tax concept must be debated; not how should we
collect revenue for the state but rather how should we as a society seek to
distribute income and the attributes it possesses. 14
The proponents of redistribution present a strong case if one accepts their
premise that economic control and political power accompany wealth. If we
believe that the optimum social organization requires the greatest participation
possible by all citizens so that society generally can enjoy the fruits of its
labours, participate in the democratic decision-making process, and achieve a
more equal distribution of economic control over its members, it is obvious
that measures must be enacted to help distribute the bases of economic and
political power. 15 The optimal distribution of society's resources is one that
promotes the growth of our democratic political structures and the system of
free enterprise they engender.
It is not so clear, however, why we should resort to income taxation if our
goal is more equal wealth distribution. 16 Other bases, or a combination of
13 Simons, supra note 12, at v.
14 As Simons explained, supra note 12, at 18-19:
Taxation must affect the distribution of income, whether we will it or not; and it is
only sensible to face the question as to what kinds of effects are desirable. To do
this is to reduce the discussion frankly to the level of ethics or aesthetics. Such pro-
cedure, however, is certainly preferable to the traditional one of "describing" the
attributes of the good life in terms which simply are not descriptive.
The case for drastic progression in taxation must be rested on the case against in-
equality - on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevailing distribution of
wealth and income reveals a degree (and/or kind) or inequality which is distinctly
evil or unlovely.
Richard Goode maintains, however, that progressive rates are appropriate for
allocating taxes according to ability to pay and this objective should remain the primary
objective of a progressive income tax. He admits "the reduction of economic inequality
is a valid objective," but asserts "it is secondary to the objective of allocating taxes ac-
cording to ability to pay." Goode, The Individual Income Tax (rev. ed., Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1976) at 20.
l5See Blum and Kalven, supra note 10, at 493-501; Goode, supra note 14, at 22;
Potts, The Relation of the Income Tax to Democracy in the United States (1957), 10 W.
Pol. Q. 911.
16See, e.g., the comments by Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation in a Just
Society (1976), 30 Rutgers L. Rev. 62 at 62-66; Doren, Redistributing Wealth by Cur-
tailing Inheritance: The Community Interest in the Rule against Perpetuities and the
Estate Tax (1975), 3 Florida State U. L. Rev. 33 at 62-63; however, see Gunn, The Case
for an Income Tax(1979),46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 370 at 380-81.
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bases, would be more effective if that was our sole objective. Political
pragmatism has tempered that aim however, and, inadequate as it may seem to
some, we have enacted a system that, instead of taxing wealth directly, taxes
the increase in the ability to command goods and services over a given
period. 17 And it does so not merely to redistribute the goods and services that
can be purchased with the income, but to redistribute the potential economic
power the holder of income wields.18 The concept of income must embrace the
quality that we wish to tax, determined by the motivation for taxing it at pro-
gressive rates. 19
2. The Taxable Unit
When Canada first imposed federal income taxation in 1917, it chose to
follow the United States income tax system of individual taxation, rather than
the British system of marital aggregation. Thirteen years later, the United
States Supreme Court reached a decision which set that country on the road to
marital unit taxation. In the case of Poe v. Seaborn,20 the Supreme Court
decided that the community property laws of Washington treated married per-
sons as one unit and gave both partners a vested right to half the community
income and property, allowing them to split their incomes for tax purposes.
Persons living in community property states used the decision to lower their
tax liability, an option unavailable to those living in separate marital property
states. 21 Only eight states had community property systems, so the different
tax treatment resulting from the decision was tolerable at first. But as rates
rose shortly before and during the Second World War, a number of states
adopted, or contemplated adopting, community property systems to secure the
tax advantages for their citizens. To achieve uniformity in tax burdens across
the country, Congress adopted a marital schedule in 1948 that permitted all
married persons to split their incomes, regardless of the family property
regime under which they lived.22 This sytem remained in effect until 1969 when
a separate higher schedule was adopted for married persons.
The American changes had no effect on the system of individual taxation
used in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada was not faced with the same
17 An income tax alone cannot accomplish a redistribution of economic power.The
nature and pattern of government expenditures is the second half of the redistribution
equation and can either negate or achieve the redistribution begun by the tax system.
See Coleman, Redistributive Equity in Canada: Taxation and Government Expen-
ditures (1978), 16 Osgoode Hall L. J. 193.
18 "The reduction of income inequality is a more meaningful political objective of
taxation than the lessening of consumption inequality." Goode, "The Superiority of
the Income Tax," in Pechman, ed., What Should be Taxed: Income or Expenditure
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1980) 49 at 72.
19As Simons explained, supra note 12, at 41, "Income taxation is broadly an in-
strument of economic control, a means of mitigating economic inequality .... [We
shall assume that moderation of inequality is an important objective of policy and pro-
ceed to consider income taxes as devices for effecting it."
2
°Poev. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
21 For a comprehensive discussion of the background to the Poe decision and its
immediate consequences, see Burton, The Taxation of Family Income (1932), 41 Yale
L.J. 1172.
22For a brief synopsis of the legislative response to the problem, see Bittker,
FederalIncome Taxation and the Family (1975), 27 Stanford L. Rev. 1389 at 1404-14.
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issue its American counterpart had in Poe until 1962 when a taxpayer attempt-
ed to split his income with his wife by utilizing Quebec's community property
law. 23 In Frank Sura v. M.N.R.,24 the Supreme Court of Canada differen-
tiated the Quebec community property system from those in the United States
and held that the Quebec system did not entitle citizens of that province to split
income for federal tax purposes. Quebec was the only province with a com-
munity property system and the issue that had led to a fundamental change in
the United States income tax law quietly faded away in Canada.
Since rates reflect directly on the amount collected by a unit, it is essential
that an appropriate unit for taxation be adopted. 25 Conversely, the choice of
unit should reflect the ability of that unit to enjoy the attributes of the income
it receives. Thus, it is generally conceded that income as defined in a graduated
system of taxation is meaningless without reference to the appropriate taxable
unit. However, the goal of progressive taxation using a comprehensive tax
base to reflect the economic ability of income earners will not in itself help one
define the appropriate tax unit. 26 While certain economic units are able to
recognize economies of scale, the choice of the unit in which income is to be
23 Taxpayers in Quebec had tried to use the community property laws as a device to
split income shortly after the introduction of income taxation. However, revenue of-
ficials assessed all income earned by the community in the hands of the husband, as
head of the community. (See Bourassa in Can. H. of C. Deb. June 10, 1926, at 4306). It
was common practice in Quebec for upper income taxpayers to enter into marriage con-
tracts that set aside the community. This practice, as well as the real differences between
the Quebec and American community systems, likely accounts for the fact that it took
forty-five years for the issue to reach the Supreme Court of Canada.
24 [1962] C.T.C. 1, 62 D.T.C. 1005.
2 As Blum and Kalven explain, supra note 10, at 431-32:
With a flat tax it is a matter of indifference what the taxable unit is. But under a
progressive system this issue poses an almost insuperably difficult problem of equi-
ty among taxpayers. The unit selected by the tax system for comparing incomes will
determine the size of income aggregates subject to tax, and the size of the income
aggregates will determine the effective rates of tax. Different solutions to the unit
problem will produce marked differeNes in the allocation of the tax burden.26 Professor Bittker claims, "The concept of a comprehensive tax base is of no
assistance in selecting the taxpaying unit." He says, "I find nothing in the CTB concept
that leads inexorably, or even points vaguely, to the conclusion that the income of in-
dividuals should be taxed, rather than the income of married couples, families, or
households, or that tells us anything about the extent to which tax rates should take ac-
count of marriage bonds or family responsibilities." Bittker, A Comprehensive Tax
Base as a Goal of Income TaxReform (1967), 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925 at 974, 976-77.
This observation prompted a reply by Professor Musgrave in which he pointed out
that while the concept might not spell out the appropriate unit, it would help establish
the guidelines for choosing that unit. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept(1967), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 44 at 60-61. Both Bittker's and Musgrave's articles were
reprinted in Bittker et al., A Comprehensive Tax Base? A Debate (Branford, Conn.:
Federal Tax Press, 1968).
Professors McIntyre and Oldman claimed to have arrived at the proper tax unit
through an application of the Haig-Simons comprehensive tax base income concept.
(McIntyre and Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified In-
come Tax (1977), 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 at 1576.) To do so, however, they chose a nar-
row definition of income in which the consumption element of income is restricted to
actual beneficial enjoyment of the goods or services acquired. As this paper will show,
such a definition is quite inappropriate when considered in light of the purpose for
which we tax income progressively.
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measured is a political one, 27 and in Canada it has been decided that each tax-
paying unit should consist of separate individuals. The Canadian income tax
system is not entirely consistent in applying its choice of the taxpaying unit
since in a number of instances it takes into account a taxpayer's family or
marital status when determining tax liability. These are exceptions to the
general rule, however, designed to achieve particular non-tax social goals, and
a taxpayer's status as a separate unit for tax purposes is not altered by family
or social ties.
The necessary corollary to the adoption of an individual unit for the pur-
pose of measuring the earning of income is the retention of the same unit for
measuring the use of that income. If the tax system does not make an
allowance for every individual's ability to realize certain economies of scale, it
must similarly ignore the loss of economy if the taxpayer chooses to support
more or fewer persons on his or her individual income. Taken to its logical
conclusion, this proposition would imply that no recognition should be given
to the taxpayer's obligation to support dependents. 28 The Act deviates from
this principle and provides an explicit tax expenditure to taxpayers supporting
families through the adoption of a fixed deduction for dependents. At the
same time, it prohibits income splitting between a taxpayer and his or her
dependents. A taxpayer might pass on income to dependents to divide physical
consumption between the taxpayer and dependents, but this will not lower his
or her income and there are no provisions to similarly divide the amount for
tax purposes. Income should be defined in such a manner that its use or
distribution will not affect its measurement in the hands of the original owner.
The concept of income employed in the Act serves to reinforce the choice of an
27 Our goal of taxing comprehensive income bases at progressive rates will help us
understand why the appropriate unit should be chosen. But it is our external social and
political mores that will decide what social units we consider to be economic units. More
importantly, the balancing of income measurement goals with neutrality as between dif-
ferent economic units and the need for neutrality vis-t-vis individual entry and exit from
the work force must be done by reference to standards outside the realm of pure tax
theory. As Professor Surrey has explained:
[Tihe questions involved in determining the units to be taxed must initially be deter-
mined by policy makers and not technicians. As to individuals, for example, is the
family to be taxed as one unit and if so who are members of the family, or are in-
dividuals to be taxed separately, or is some other approach to be chosen? There are
no normative answers to these questions. Instead the response depends on a coun-
try's attitudes toward women, marriage, the sexual makeup of the work force,
property ownership, the care of children, and so on.
Surrey, The Concept and Its Uses (1979), 1 Can. Tax. 2 at 3, 4. See also Surrey,
Pathways to Tax Reform (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1973) at 17.
Roger Smith has similarly suggested that "the Haig-Simons definition which has
proved so helpful in defining the tax expenditure concept offers little or no guidance in
determining the appropriate taxable unit.... That which is appropriate is very much a
sociological, administrative, and political question as well as an economic question."
Smith, Tax Expenditures: An Examination of TaxPreferences in the Canadian Federal
Income Tax System (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1979) at 31, 34. Pechman,
too, believes the comprehensive tax base is neutral vis-A-vis the appropriate tax unit. See
Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment (1968), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 63
at 65, also reproduced in Bittker et al., supra note 26.
28 See Robinson, The Treatment of Dependents Under the Personal Income Tax
(1970), 18 Can. Tax J. 44. Robinson argues that a refundable credit would best achieve
the goals of the dependents' deductions.
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individual as a tax unit by preventing income splitting between separate tax
units.
B. The Quality of Income
1. The Definition of Income: Consumption as Control
a) Income Transfers
While there appears to be a consensus among scholars that the Haig-
Simons definition of income is a good starting point for determining the ap-
plication of an income tax, there is an equal lack of agreement as to what the
definition means.
That definition encompasses two distinct halves, each of which can be ex-
amined separately. Henry Simons said, "Personal income may be defined as
the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question." ' 29 Both elements accruing to the
taxpayer embody economic power, that is, the utility of income or its ability to
exercise dominion over goods and services in the marketplace. This accretion
in utility or market rights is measured in the hands of a tax unit over a period
of time, the tax period. At the end of the tax period the taxpayer has either
added to his or her capital or consumed with the income not saved.
The extent to which the taxpayer did not draw upon the utility of his or
her income but instead banked it is relatively easy to recognize. Much more
ambiguous is the meaning of consumption. Income, for tax purposes, does not
literally measure all that "comes in." It is unquestionably a net concept: the
actual increase in economic power accruing to the taxpayer at the end of the
period. Expenditures incurred to earn income do not comprise an element of
income. Thus, even the broadest view of consumption would include only net
increases in economic power not saved, that is, all applications of income aside
from those incurred to earn the net income. A much narrower view of con-
sumption starts with the same net economic power not saved (that is, after ex-
penses) and then proceeds to exclude certain applications of that power. The
economic rights of the taxpayer excluded from this view of consumption are
those that were not exercised in the marketplace by the taxpayer for his or her
benefit directly, but which were instead transferred to others to exercise for
their benefit. 30 This narrow version of consumption encompasses the concept
of direct benefit.
Proponents of the narrow view of consumption seek to utilize the concept
as "an index of relative material well-being." 31 In other words, they would use
an income tax as a progressive tax on one's standard of living. 32 But on what
29 Simons, supra note 12, at 50.
30David Bradford labels the former view an "ability to pay consumption" as op-
posed to outlays for the taxpayer's direct benefit, which he calls a "standard-of-living
consumption." Bradford's terminology is useful for illustrating the different concepts
the two views seek to measure. Bradford, The Choice Between Income and Consump-
tion Taxes (1982), 16 Tax Notes 715 at 723.31 Andrews, supra note 7, at 335.
32 Professor Warren has offered a definition of consumption that would achieve
the same results as that of Professor Andrews, were it literally applied. Professor War-
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grounds might we seek to redistribute physical consumption, the appropria-
tion of real goods and services? This redistribution lessens one type of in-
equality and gives everyone a more equal share of the pie of available goods
and services. It redistributes the ultimate exercise of economic power.
However, it does not redistribute true economic power. True economic power
does not belong to those who only physically consume. Rather, it belongs to
those who hold the rights to appropriate from the social pool of available
goods and services and who can decide to utilize those rights or forgo their use
by passing them on to others to exercise.
Were a progressive rate structure designed to redistribute only the use of
income (the power of income in its final application), it would be appropriate
to consider only physical consumption as the consumption element of income.
But progressive income tax does not seek to redistribute physical consumption.
If it is to accomplish its social and economic aims, it must redistribute the
economic and social power of income, not simply its marketplace utility. The
true economic power of income which we seek to redistribute with our tax
system is not its application but rather the right it confers on the holder to
potentially exercise dominion over goods or services. 33
Different definitions of income follow directly from different perceptions
of the purpose of an income tax. If we sought to redistribute real goods and
services, the total income available for redistribution would equal the sum of
all income put into savings, and thus made unavailable for consumption, and
all income actually used for consumption. Thus, as income is transferred from
one taxpayer to another by way of donation, alimony, gift or any means by
which the transferor is not "really" consuming, it would only be included in
taxable income once because it will only be used once to appropriate actual
goods and services. But if our concern were to redistribute potential economic
power, income could be taxed once or twice or an infinite number of times as it
ren suggests that consumption means "the ultimate use or destruction of economic
resources (as by the drinking of a glass of wine)." Warren, Would a Consumption Tax
Be Fairer Than an Income Tax? (1980), 89 Yale L. J. 1081 at 1084. Professor Popkin
relies on a similar understanding of consumption. He claims it "includes only expenses
that express particular life-style choices." Popkin, Defining Taxable Consumption: A
Comment on Personal Insurance Premiums (1979), 54 Indiana L. J. 389 at 390. At one
point even Simons offers a definition similar in essence to the ultimate physical con-
sumption of Professor Andrews. Simons said, "Consumption as a quantity denotes the
value of rights exercised in a certain way (in destruction of economic goods)." Simons,
supra note 12, at 49-50. It is likely that this explanation was not meant to categorically
define consumption, however. He used the illustration as a contrast with accumulation
to illustrate the meaning of the latter concept. Professor Andrews begins with the
Simons definition of income as consumption and accumulation. He quickly shifts to
one that would "apportion tax burdens in uniform, graduated relation to real consump-
tion and accumulation." Andrews, supra note 7, at 331 [emphasis added].
33 George Schanz, the German theoritician to whom Simons often referred, ex-
plains the concept in a passage quoted by Simons: "We want to know to what extent a
person is an independent economic unit in a specific period and what means they had
for their disposition during this period without having to use their own assets or means
or the assets of others (debts)." Simons, supra note 12, at 61 (translated by the author).
The resources the taxpayer had for his or her disposition are not just savings ac-
cumulated at the end of the period but total resources available during the period.
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accords power to the holder, despite the fact that it will only be used once in
the market. 34
One reason proponents of the narrow view of consumption would use an
income tax only to "reduce disparities in standards of living" by redistributing
actual consumption of economic resources by a taxpayer is their belief that an
income tax is an inappropriate vehicle for equalizing the distribution of one
type of economic power given its inability to tax all forms of power equally. 35
It is quite true that an income tax cannot alter the distribution of power bases
that it was never intended to affect; this observation should be of little conse-
quence when adopting a progressive income tax to mitigate inequalities in the
distribution of a particular form of economic power.
An income tax system that defined income as actual real consumption and
accumulation might be established with either a flat or graduated structure.
The choice will turn on whether the tax is designed to provide revenue for the
government or to redistribute consumption as it does so. However, if the con-
cept of income is expanded to include potential command as well as actual
utilization by the taxpayer in the market, it is only logical to adopt a pro-
gressive rate structure, for the only explanation for the broader definition is a
desire to redistribute something greater than actual consumption. Assuming
that income transfers such as gifts or support payments are to be taxed only
once, under a flat rate income tax the transferor and the recipient end up in the
same net positions regardless of in whose hands the amount is taxed. Under a
flat rate income (broadly defined) tax, a donor would not be permitted a
deduction for an income transfer and the recipient would receive only the
after-tax portion of the amount available for transfer. The result is identical to
that which would ensue if a flat rate of tax were imposed on real consumption,
and the donor given a complete deduction for the transferred amount and that
sum taxed in the hands of the recipient, thus making the definition of income
irrelevant. This is not the case in a progressive income (broadly defined) tax
system. When a graduated rate structure is applied to these transfers, higher
marginal rates are imposed on the transferor and the recipient ends up with a
smaller net amount, while the government has more for its distribution pur-
poses as the donor's income rises. As the donor's income rises, the effect is an
34 Simons stated that the notion that income should only be taxed once when it is
only used once for actual appropriation of goods or services makes sense only if it is
believed that the total of all personal income will add up to a separate measurable whole
which can then be distributed, an idea he called a "disastrous misconception." See
Simons, supra note 12, at 58. See also text accompanying note 181, infra, for a discus-
sion of why it is appropriate to include gifts in the tax base of both donor and recipient.
Addressing the question of individuals' incomes as compared to social income,
Musgrave explained, "[Tlhe sum of individual incomes as defined under accretion ex-
ceeds national income in the economist's sense. National income excludes transfers, but
gifts are accretion to the donee without reducing the income of the donor. The defense
for the accretion plus consumption concept as an index of equality must rest on its
superiority as an equity concept, not as a tool of economic theory." Musgrave, supra
note 26, at 48.
35 As Professor Andrews points out, "One might wish also to reduce inequalities in
power or pleasure more generally, but those wishes are beyond what it is practical to ex-
pect an income tax to accomplish." Andrews, supra note 7, at 356.
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increasing transfer from the donor to the state of the ability to shift consump-
tion and choose recipients of income transfers.
b) Assignments of Income
Income must be defined so that persons will be taxed on the economic
potential they command and not on their potential to acquire the economic
rights that will grant them access to the market. Once a taxpayer acquires this
power, the income tax system is indifferent to the use to which it is put.
Whether a person consumes wisely or poorly, underpays or overpays for pur-
chases, or retains all of his or her income or gives it all away should have no ef-
fect on his or her tax liability.
It is also true that the income tax system is indifferent as to the time at
which a taxpayer incurred an obligation to transfer income to another person.
This principle is firmly imbedded in the structure of the Act. Subsections 56(2)
and 56(4) provide that income transfers or assignments will be ignored for tax
purposes. 36 The Act provides no deduction for gifts and only a limited deduc-
tion is available for charitable donations to certain registered charities and
charitable foundations. Taxpayers are, of course, free to utilize their income
or to legally obligate themselves to give it to others for the recipients' con-
sumption. They are similarly free to transfer income after it is received or com-
mit themselves to transfer it before it is earned. In all of these cases, they will
be taxed to the extent that they acquired rights that enable the holder to exer-
cise command over economic resources, rather than the degree to which they
exercised those rights.
2. The Question of Property Income
The most important concept in defining income thus far has been that of
control. We wish to tax the economic potential of income and are not concern-
ed with its actual use - the taxpayer might transfer the ability to consume to
someone else but the initial power to make that decision is the quality that in-
come taxation seeks to tax and redistribute.
A number of new issues arise when we turn to the question of income
from property. Until it is actually consumed, property always retains the
power to create income either directly or through conversion to an income pro-
ducing asset. And unlike income from services, the entity actually producing
the income can be transferred to another taxpayer, either partially or absolute-
ly, permanently or temporarily. These unique features of property give rise to
a number of concerns that must be addressed when determining who should
bear the tax liability on transferred property income.
In the Canadian income tax system, under almost all circumstances, in-
come from property in which the transferor retains an interest is taxed in the
transferor's hands and income from property from which the transferor has
36 The incorporation of this rule into the Act at an early date left little room for the
courts or legislature to expound the rationale on which it was based. In the United
States, however, it was largely left to the courts to establish a definition of income that
would achieve Congress' intention in introducing a progressive income tax. This led to
the development in the United States of a well-articulated assignment of income doc-
trine, whose effect was similar to that of the Canadian provisions.
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severed all ties is taxed in the hands of the recipient, even where inadequate or
no consideration was paid for the property. 37 This result, not taxing the person
who retains no interest in transferred property on subsequently generated in-
come, seems intuitively correct. It accords with the Haig-Simons income
definition and the broad view of consumption that has been suggested is
preferable given the purposes attributed to our progressive income tax system.
It will be recalled that the Haig-Simons definition of income states that income
during the tax period equals the sum of consumption plus change in net value
over that period. Consumption is composed of two elements, actual physical
consumption and economic potential within the control of the taxpayer, i.e.
money that would have gone to the taxpayer if not for an assignment or other
transfer on his or her part. Property income follows its source and in the
absence of a transfer or assignment accrues to the benefit of the person
holding the beneficial (and often also legal) interest in the property. Since
property income does not flow to a former owner, the taxpayer who transfers
property has no "control" over the subsequently generated income. Once
property passes to a new owner, the former owner is never in a position to ex-
ercise the economic power of the income produced by either consuming with it
or redirecting it for others to consume with. It follows that income from prop-
erty should be taxed in the hands of the new owner following a transfer of the
property, even where no or less than adequate consideration has been paid.
III. APPLYING THE INCOME TAX BASE TO SUPPORT PAYMENTS
A. What are Support Payments?
The obligation to pay support3 8 to a spouse or ex-spouse has its roots in
the common law doctrine euphemistically labelled unity of married persons.
At common law, upon marriage a woman ceased to have a separate iden-
tity - her personality merged with that of her husband. 39 A number of prin-
37The important exceptions to these general rules are the attribution provisions
covering property transfers to spouses and children. These provisions attribute income
generated by property that has been transferred by the taxpayer to a spouse or child. See
Income TaxAct, s. 74(l) and 75(1).38 Technically, support provided to a spouse following separation and prior to
divorce is called alimony. After divorce payments to an ex-spouse are known as
maintenance. Terminology usage has become very relaxed in recent times. While the
Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, still speaks of alimony and maintenance using their
historic meanings (ss. 10 and 11), the terms are now generally interchangeable. Provin-
cial legislation such as the Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, uses the term
"support" for payments made before or after a divorce. The Income Tax Act actually
uses the terms in the opposite contexts to their traditional usage (s. 56(l)(b) and (c)).
For a discussion of the relationship between alimony's etymological roots and historical
rationale, see Ryan and Granfield, Domestic Relations - Civil and Canon Law(Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1963) at 363.
39 Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Law of England (4th ed., Dublin: Exshaw,
Saunder, Baulter, Grierson and Williams, 1771) at 442:
By marriage the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incor-
porated or consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wings, protection,
and cover she performs everything .... Upon this principle, of an union of person
in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties and liabilities, that
either of them acquired by the marriage.
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ciples flowed from this subordination and merger process, 40 the most impor-
tant of which was the transfer of a woman's property rights to her husband as
her separate legal personality vanished. 4 1 As a woman's personal and property
rights passed to her husband, a corresponding obligation arose for her hus-
band to support his wife. 42
Prior to the Reformation, the solemnization of marriage was solely a
church function. Marriage was a sacrament and hence indissoluble; the only
way to undo a marriage was to have it declared a nullity, a form of divorce vin-
cula matrimonii (a divorce dissolving the marriage tie), or, at a later date, to
petition Parliament for a divorce, an alternative open only to the very wealthy.
A divorce vincula matrimonii based on nullity grounds meant that the putative
marriage was void ab initio. A wife's property was returned to her and there
was no continuing duty of the "husband" to support his "wife" - they had
never been married.
In the vast majority of cases there were no grounds for a nullity finding
and the sole relief available was a judicial separation granted by the ec-
clesiastical courts, a divorce a mensa et thoro (from table and bed), available
only when one partner had committed adultery. The decree granted only a
separation and the marriage was not dissolved; in theory the partners were
merely separate while awaiting reconciliation. Because the marriage remained
intact, the husband retained his spouse's property and his common law duty to
support her. The ecclesiastical courts therefore made alimony awards an-
cilliary to the divorce a mensa et thoro decree. 43 Adultery being the only
grounds for separation, alimony acquired some elements of punishment as not
only the amount of the property the husband had received but also the degree
of his guilt were taken into account when determining the amount of the
alimony award.
A husband's support obligation applied only to a wife who remained with
him or who could excuse her absence due to her husband's misconduct; no
alimony was awarded to a "guilty" wife. Parliamentary divorce, however,
often made continued support to a "guilty" wife a condition to the granting of
a decree. 44
Following the American Revolution, jurisdiction to grant absolute
divorces was conferred by statutes on the regular courts in the United States,
no system of ecclesiastical courts having been established on this side of the
Atlantic. Since the marriage was now ended by the divorce decree, the existing
rationale for alimony was no longer applicable. The courts nevertheless con-
4°For example, the doctrine of inter-spousal immunity (a man could not sue
himself) and the legal incapacity of a woman to contract, sue or be sued without joining
her husband all flowed from the unity concept.
41 A married woman did retain some minor property rights. See McCaughan, The
Legal Status of Married Women in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 3.42 Vernier and Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Pres-
ent Statutory Structure (1939), 6 Law & Contem. Prob. 197 at 199; Blackstone, supra
note 39.
43 Blackstone, supra note 39, at 441: "In the case of divorce a mensa et thoro, the
law allows alimony to the wife; which is that allowance, which is made to a woman for
her support out of her husband's estate."
44MacQueen, Divorce and Matrimonial Jurisdiction (London: Maxwell, Sweet
and Stevens & Norton, 1858) at 55-56.
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tinued to grant alimony as an incident of divorce where so authorized by
statute45 and the struggle to characterize the obligation began. 46
In England divorce jurisdiction did not pass to the common law courts
until 1857, at which time absolute divorces became possible without resort to
Parliament. In Canada the federal government had apparent jurisdiction over
divorce.47 However, in the absence of comprehensive federal legislation courts
relied on provincial law, supplemented by some federal modifications, for
divorce authority. The divorce laws of five provinces were based on the
English Act of 1857 and those of the Maritime provinces were based on similar
pre-Confederation local statutes. The courts in two provinces, Newfoundland
and Quebec, had no authority to grant divorces. 48
Pressure for reform eventually led to the adoption of a federal Divorce
Act,49 which pre-empted all existing provincial divorce legislation and laid
down a uniform law for the entire country.5 0 The Divorce Act provided
authority for alimony awards following the commencement of a divorce action
and prior to a judgment5' and maintenance orders ancilliary to a final decree.5 2
While conduct remains a factor in awarding alimony or maintenance, 53 the
provisions have shifted the emphasis from fault to need, and from a husband's
duty to support his wife to a mutual support obligation. While the view that
alimony flows from a right to support inherent in the nature of marriage itself
still surfaces on very rare occasions, current legal thought has largely rejected
the idea of a right to support 54 and the courts have tended to agree with this
view.55
The Divorce Act applied to divorce actions only, while provincial law, 56
45 In some exceptional cases alimony was granted in the absence of authorizing
legislation. See Compton, Cases on Domestic Relations (St. Paul: West, 1951) at 302.
46See, e.g., Munson, Some Aspects of the Nature of Permanent Alimony (1916),
16 Col. L. Rev. 217.
47The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 92(26) gave the
federal government the power over "Marriage and Divorce."
48 See, generally, Mendes da Costa, "Divorce," in Mendes da Costa, ed., Studies
in Canadian Family Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) 359 at 362-65; Davies, 1 Power
on Divorce and Other Matrimonial Causes (Toronto: Carswell, 1976) at 1-8.
4 9 R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8.
50 Section 23 of the DivorceAct repealed all existing provincial divorce laws.
51R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, s. 10.52 R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, s. 11.
53 Subsection 11(1): "Upon granting a decree nisi of divorce, the court may, if it
thinks it fit and just to do so having regard to the conduct of the parties and the condi-
tion, means and other circumstances of each of them, make one or more of the follow-
ing orders.... "54 See, e.g., Law Reform Commission of Canada, Maintenance on Divorce, Work-
ing Paper 12 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) at 18.
55The language of Schartner v. Schartner (1970), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 61 at 70, 72
W.W.R. 443 at 452 (Sask. Q.B.) is not atypical: "The presumption that a wife is entitl-
ed to such maintenance unless legal grounds exist that justify its refusal no longer
exists." In that case the wife refused alimony and was subsisting on welfare at the time
of the hearing.
56Most provincial statutes provided for an alimony obligation from husband to
wife only and many contained dum casta clauses obligating a separated wife to remain
chaste to her husband. Furthermore, a wife seeking alimony had to demonstrate her
desire to resume cohabitation as a condition of entitlement. (See, e.g., Cole v. Cole,
[1973] 3 O.R. 665, 37 D.L.R. (3d) 685, 10 R.F.L. 367 (Ont. C.A.).)
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often archaic, continued to govern separations where no divorce action was in-
itiated, as well as void or voidable marriages. Provincial governments also
continued to retain exclusive jurisdiction over property divisions between
spouses or ex-spouses. In the mid-1970s, pressure for a change in the law of
matrimonial property led to the enactment of reform legislation in most prov-
inces. In addition to altering the law of property division, the provincial laws
extended and altered the nature of support obligations. In response to sugges-
tions that the law of alimony or support should recognize the obligation of
each partner to support him- or herself, 57 the new legislation generally adopted
the premise that the primary purpose of support payments was to help a
spouse or ex-spouse attain self-sufficiency. 58 The most important criteria for
fixing alimony levels are the recipient's need and the payor's ability to support.
But despite strong criticism of the procedure, 59 conduct remains a factor in
both divorce and non-divorce separations. 6°
The most significant development in the alimony concept has been the ex-
tension of the support obligation to marriage-like situations in the provincial
reform legislation. This obligation no longer flows from the marriage, whence
it originated, but now arises as a result of a certain type of relationship having
existed. Thus, many Canadian jurisdictions now extend a support obligation
to persons deemed to be "spouses" by virtue of their cohabitation with the
party seeking support or their parenting a child resulting from the
relationship. 61
Attempts to devise an independent rationale for support obligations have
been made by those unhappy with the intellectual framework and social im-
plications of the traditional alimony theory. The theory that has gained con-
siderable support suggests that the division of family labour and the subse-
quent support obligation arising from that division should be thought of as
arising from an implied contract. 62 Under the implied contract theory of sup-
port obligations, partners to a marriage or family-like relationship are assum-
57 See, e.g., supra note 54, at 20; Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on
Family Law (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976) at 41.58 See, e.g., Family LawReform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, s. 15.
59 Payne, Maintenance Rights and Obligations: A Search for Uniformity (1978), 1
Fam. L. Rev. 2 at 10-12; University of Alberta, Institute of Law Research and Reform,
Matrimonial Support, Report No. 27 (Edmonton, 1978) at 23-27 canvesses prevailing
opinion. The authors of this report favoured retention of conduct as a criterion when
determining support awards.
6 For divorce see, supra note 53; in non-divorce cases see, e.g., Family Law
Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, s. 18(6).
61 Ontario, British Columbia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Nova
Scotia and the Yukon have such provisions.62 See e.g., supra note 54, at 23-25:
A division of function between marriage partners, where one is a wage earner and
the other remains at home will almost invariably create an economic need in one
spouse during marriage. The spouse who stops working in order to care for
children and manage a household usually requires financial provision from the
other. On divorce, the law should ascertain the extent to which the withdrawal
from the labour force by the dependent spouse during marriage (including loss of
skills, seniority, work experience, continuity and so on) has adversely affected that
spouse's ability to maintain himself or herself. The need upon which the right to
maintenance is based therefore follows from the loss incurred by the maintained
spouse in contributing to the marriage partnership.
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ed to expect that they will face a support obligation if the division of labour in
that relationship were such that their gain in wage earning ability was offset by
an equal decline in the other partner's income earning ability due to the
assumption of household responsibilities outside the labour force. 63
The implied contract theory of support responsibilities suggests that
alimony and maintenance obligations have evolved from a personal duty of a
husband to support his "other half' to a responsibility to supplement the in-'
come of a person whose inability to be self-sufficient following the termination
of a relationship can be traced in some way to the relationship. As intellectually
attractive as the rationale may be, however, it fails to fully explain the support
obligation. The statutes authorize, and the courts readily impose, support
obligations in cases where the recipient is unable to care for him- or herself
because of factors completely extraneous to the relationship, such as financial
mismanagement, mental illness or physical incapacity. 64 One might wonder
why a former spouse and not the state or society at large should be responsible
for another person's support in such cases. The desire of the government to
pass the costs of support on to persons whose only connection to the
recipient's need for support was participation in a now defunct relationship
not connected to the present inability to be self-sufficient might make fiscal
sense for the state but is hard to comprehend from a policy perspective unless
one returns once again to the belief that the support obligation is inherent in a
relationship. 65
We should point out that this approach to maintenance necessarily means that as
far as the law is concerned, each spouse has an equal responsibility for the three
essential functions characteristic of the marriage partnership: financial provision,
household management and child care....
We propose that a right to maintenance may arise from "the express or tacit
understanding of the spouses that one will maintain the other" so long as such an
arrangement, made either before or during marriage, results in a reasonable need
for financial provision for the maintained spouse at the time of divorce.
63 The theory is strengthened by the fact that spouses or persons who are cohabiting
are able to expressly contract out of support obligations. See, e.g., Family Law Reform
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, s. 51(1)(b), 52(1)(b), 53(1)(b).
64 See, e.g., Coupland v. Coupland (1981), 25 R.F.L. (2d) 230, 12 A.C.W.S. (2d)
136 (Ont. H.C.) where a wife awarded nominal maintenance of $1 per year at the time
of divorce because of her inheritance of over half a million dollars successfully applied
for an increase to $500 a month seven years later after she had squandered the in-
heritance, the only alternative available to her being welfare; Bates v. Bates (1971), 7
R.F.L. 344 (N.B. S.C.) where a wife who was capable of supporting herself but for her
mental illness was given a lump sum support award; Upson v. Upson (1970), 2 R.F.L.
405 (Sask. Q.B.) where a wife unable to seek employment because of bleeding ulcers
was awarded support as long as her medical problem persisted.
65 An extreme example of the inherent right doctrine is that of Astor v. Astor, 89
So. 2d 645 at 648 (Fla. S.Ct. 1956) where the court accepted the chancellor's finding
that the wife had been "motivated and dominated by greed for money," yet granted her
a weekly alimony of $250 per week despite the fact that her maximum income before
marriage had been $65 per week and the marriage had been of only six weeks' duration.
To do otherwise, the court declared, "would fail to recognize the fundamental nature
of the marriage relationship and the rights and obligations it imposes upon each of the
parties."
Canadian courts generally no longer contend a person has a "right" to support. See,
e.g., Schartner, supra note 55. Nevertheless, the ties between sought-for support and
any aspect of the marital relationship aside from the relationship itself remain tenuous
in many cases. For example, a plaintiff in Davis v. Davis (1971), 4 R.F.L. 160 (Ont.
S.C.) sought support from a husband with whom she had cohabited for just over one
month.
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The character and treatment of support obligations has greatly changed
during their evolution from their common law alimony origins. What was once
a logical consequence of the doctrine of unity is now a much broader general
obligation faced by all parties to certain types of relationships. The principles
behind the obligation are no longer easy to discern.
B. The Tax Treatment of Support Payments
Prior to 1942, Canadian courts relied on American precedent to hold that
alimony payments were neither deductible to the payor nor taxable income to
the recipient. The American position evolved from precedents predating the
permanent adoption of income taxation in that country. The need to
characterize the payment had arisen most often in adjudications in bankruptcy
where the issue confronted was whether a discharge from debts in bankruptcy
extended to an alimony obligation. When the issue reached the Supreme Court
of the United States it accorded alimony a unique character; it was neither a
gift from payor to recipient nor an obligation founded on contract. As a per-
sonal obligation of the payor arising out of a marriage relationship and a hus-
band's duty to support his wife, it could not be considered a debt. Thus,
neither alimony in arrears at the time of bankruptcy nor alimony accruing
after that date could be discharged by an order in bankruptcy adjudication. 66
The appropriate treatment of alimony for tax purposes was first con-
sidered by the same court in the 1917 case of Gould v. Gould,67 which was
heard shortly after the passage of the first Canadian income tax act and prior
to its implementation. In that case the taxpayer was an alimony recipient who
sought to dispute an assessment that had included her alimony receipts in her
taxable income. The Supreme Court found that alimony was not "income"
within the meaning of the predecessor to the present charging section 68 but the
rationale is not easily perceived in the short two and a half page judgment.
Two factors are mentioned. The first is the personal nature of the obligation,
flowing from the institution of marriage, as articulated by the Court in the
earlier bankruptcy case to which reference was made. Second, the Court
pointed out that the payment was not deductible by the payor and quickly
jumped to the conclusion that the "sum received by the wife on account
thereof [as alimony] cannot be regarded as income arising or accruing to her
within the enactment." ' 69 Commentators have suggested it was this latter
ground, that the sums were not deductible by the payor, that was the real ra-
6Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 at 577-78, 21 S. Ct. 735 at 736 (1901). The
Court said:
Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of
marriage. It is not founded on contract, express or implied but on the natural and
legal duty of the husband to support the wife.... Permanent alimony is regarded
rather as a portion of the husband's estate to which the wife is equitably entitled,
than as strictly a debt; alimony from time to time may be regarded as a portion of
his current income or earnings.67 Gouldv. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53 (1917).
68Now I.R.C. §61.
69 Gould, supra note 67, at 154 (U.S.), 53 (S.Ct.).
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tionale for the decision. 70 The income tax assessors would have taxed the
payments twice, initially in the hands of the payor and again in those of the
recipient. The Supreme Court of the United States felt the transferred amounts
could only be "income" to one party.
Sir Thomas White, the Canadian Finance Minister who introduced in-
come taxation to Canada, believed his Act permitted taxpayers to deduct
amounts paid as alimony when calculating taxable income 71 and that these
amounts would be assessed as income to the recipient. 72 By the time the tax
was in place, however, the American precedent of Gould had been established
and it was soon cited in Canada as authority for the inability of payors to
deduct such amounts, and recipients to exclude such amounts, from their tax-
able income.73
Taxpayers on both sides of the border looked for a vehicle with which
they could skirt the Gould precedent. Those with sufficient property could
seek a property settlement in satisfaction of their alimony obligation. This
alternative was not feasible, however, in those forums where the courts claim-
ed ongoing jurisdiction over spousal support obligations so they could modify
an alimony award or property settlement in lieu of alimony at any future time.
The taxpayer who transferred property in satisfaction of his alimony obliga-
70 See, e.g., Note (1918), 31 Harv. L. Rev. 494: "It is not an allowable deduction in
the husband's return and hence is taxed with his general income .... To tax it again, in
the form of alimony, would be double taxation of the most obvious sort. It is un-
doubtedly this consideration which led the court to the present conclusion." See also
Gornick, Alimony and the Income Tax (1943), 29 Cornell L. Q. 28 at 29; Chommie,
The Law of Federal Income Taxation (2d ed., St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1973) at 482;
Lagomarcino, Federal Tax Consequences of Alimony and Separate Maintenance
Payments (1954), 3 Buffalo L. Rev. 179.
Over thirty years later the Court of Claims responded to a taxpayer's argument that
alimony was not income, based on Gould, supra note 67, by noting:
The [Gould] court used language which indicated it thought alimony was not in-
come. The court did not purport to be deciding a constitutional question [that is,
whether the amounts were "income" which the Sixteenth Amendment permitted
Congress to tax] but only a question of the interpretation of the Income TaxAct of
1913. It would have been hard to believe that Congress intended to tax the receipt
of alimony by the divorced wife, when the law had already taxed the husband upon
his receipt of the income from which he paid the alimony....
Mahana v. U.S., 88 F. Supp. 285 at 288 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied 339 U.S. 978, rehearing
denied 340 U.S. 847 (1950).
71 in response to a question posed during the debate on the income tax bill, he
replied, "I think it would be held that the husband would be liable to taxation on his net
income, that is to say his income less the amount he was obliged to pay to his wife."Quoted in Pontifex, Canadian Income Tax(Toronto: Carswell, 1917) at 2.
72 White said, "If the wife had an income under a marriage settlement in excess of
the exemption provided for by this Act, whether it is called alimony or not, it is the in-
tention that she should be assessed." Quoted in Pontifex, id. at 3.
73 E.g., Plaxton and Varcoe, Dominion Income Tax Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1921)
at 150-51: "Alimony paid to a wife is not income, but is regarded rather as a portion of
the husband's income to which the wife is equitably entitled, than as strictly a debt."
This is the result of an American decision based upon the definition of income in the
United States, which for the purpose of this question may be regarded as similar to the
Dominion Act. See also Plaxton and Varcoe at 196 and Plaxton, The Law Relating to
Income Tax(Toronto: Carswell, 1939) at 107.
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tion ran the risk that the recipient might squander the property and leave him
liable to a new alimony award, notwithstanding the fact that the original settle-
ment had been intended to end any ongoing obligation. Thus, rather than
transferring the property outright, taxpayers sought to retain some control
through the trust mechanism while disposing of the property sufficiently to
transfer the income to the recipient spouse for tax purposes.
In the United States, however, characterization of the alimony obligation
as a personal domestic expense continued to plague taxpayers/settlors and of-
fered the courts a rationale for taxing the donor on income generated by prop-
erty that had been sufficiently alienated to avoid any attribution back to the
donor if the money had been used for any other purpose.
The problem was first confronted by the United States Supreme Court in
the case of Douglas v. Willcuts,74 in which the Court found a husband taxable
on income received by his wife and generated by property he had transferred to
a trust "in lieu of, and in full settlement of alimony." 75 The settlor's continu-
ing interest in the property was so obvious (amounts exceeding the agreed
upon support were to be paid to him and the property reverted to his control
upon the wife's death) it would have been easy to justify attribution of the
trust income to the settlor on the basis of his continuing control over the trust
and beneficial interest in its capital and income. The United States Supreme
Court, however, explained that the settlor would be taxed on the trust income
because it was paid to his wife in satisfaction of the taxpayer's personal obliga-
tion to support her. But in a series of cases that arose five years later, the
Supreme Court decided that in some cases payments from alimony trusts
should be taxed in the recipient's hands and not attributed to the settlor. The
Court distinguished and reconciled the various cases by making them turn on
whether the transfer of assets to the trust was in satisfaction and complete
discharge of the husband's obligation of support under state law. In other
words, the question of attribution was based not on the extent to which the set-
tlor had severed himself from the trust property, as it did in non-alimony
cases, but on whether the husband might have a potential continuing obliga-
tion under state law, notwithstanding the transfer, because the courts in that
jurisdiction claimed the ability to alter alimony awards at any time.76
An interesting result of the alimony trust cases was a gradual shift in the
manner in which the courts perceived the alimony obligation. In Helvering v.
Leonard,77 the United States Supreme Court found that the taxpayer was
74296 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 59(1935).
75Id. at 3 (U.S.), 60 (S.Ct.).
76In Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69, 60 S.Ct. 784 (1940) the Court held that the
transfer of property to a trust in favour of the taxpayer's spouse extinguished his per-
sonal obligation to support his wife and the income she received from the trust was
therefore taxable in her hands. The crucial difference between Douglas, supra note 74,
and Helvering was emphasized in two cases heard before and after Fuller. Helvering v.
Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 at 156, 60 S.Ct. 427 at 430 (1940) held attribution would follow
unless the transferor demonstrated that "local law and the alimony trust have given the
divorced husband a full discharge and leave no continuing obligation however con-
tingent." Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 at 87, 60 S.Ct. 780 at 784 (1940) confirmed
that the taxpayer must establish "by 'clear and convincing proof that local law and the
alimony trust have given him a full discharge."
77 Helvering v. Leonard, id.
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unable to prove his obligation had been fully discharged by a transfer of prop-
erty to an alimony trust. Holding him taxable on trust income paid to his ex-
wife, the Court noted, "The case in substance is the same as those where pur-
suant to contract or arrangement an obligation is discharged by another for
the taxpayer's benefit; ... or where the taxpayer creates a trust, the income of
which is applied to the discharge of his debt."78 Alimony remained a personal
obligation of the taxpayer, but it acquired debt-like properties. As a result,
lower courts began to construe lump sum settlements in lieu of alimony as
realization events in the nature of a sale or exchange, leaving the transferor
liable for taxes on all gains accrued until the time of transfer. The Supreme
Court declined to disturb these decisions. 79
Canadian taxpayers never faced the inconsistent treatment to which
Americans domiciled in different states had resigned themselves. As long as
the settlor did not establish an imperfect trust in which he retained an interest
in the income or corpus, he would not be assessed on trust income regardless
of whether or not the income from the trust was used to satisfy an alimony
obligation.80 No tax consequences followed the transfer of capital property in
a property settlement because Canada had no capital gains taxation at the
time. 81
With the advent of World War Two, tax rates began to climb in Canada
as it became a belligerent and in the United States as it rearmed. In the United
States the rise in marginal tax rates exacerbated the disparity in treatment be-
tween taxpayers in community property states and those in states with separate
property regimes for married persons. In light of the proposed rate increases in
the 1941 Revenue Bill, Treasury officials pressured Congress to place married
taxpayers in non-community property states on a parity with those in com-
munity property states by adopting a system of marital unit taxation, a pro-
posal accepted by the House Ways and Means Committee.8 2 The Senate's
response to the problem was a plan that would have taxed income to the
spouse who earned it regardless of marital property regimes. 83 The Senate also
proposed changes in the tax treatment of separated or divorced spouses. The
Senate Report noted that some taxpayers making alimony payments faced
"substantial hardship" in light of the fact that they were taxable on their en-
tire income even though a portion was payable to their separated spouse or ex-
78Id. at 85 (U.S.), 783 (S.Ct.).
79 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F. 2d 986 (C.C.A. 3d 1941), cert. denied
316 U.S. 695 (1941), rehearing denied 317 U.S. 704 (1942), and Commissioner v.
Halliwell, 131 F. 2d 642 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied 316 U.S. 655. The United
States Supreme Court did not actually rule on the matter until 1962 in U.S. v. Davis,
370 U.S. 65.
80Subsection 32(3) of the Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1917, c. 28, as am. by S.C.
1936, c. 38, s. 13, attributed trust income to the grantor where the trust could revert to
the settlor or where the settlor retained a power to choose recipients of income or to
otherwise deal with trust property.
81 A gift tax was payable on the transfer of certain types of assets to a spouse but
the tax provided a large exemption for spousal transfers.82 H.R. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. at 10-13 (1941).
83 S. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. at 9-11 (1941). The Senate and House proposals are
analysed in Lowndes, Community Income and Alimony - Taxation under the
Revenue Act of 1941 (1942), 20 Taxes 3.
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spouse. It was proposed that periodic payments in the form of alimony should
be included in the income of the recipient and deductible to the payor.
84
Neither the need for joint filing nor the transfer of tax liability on alimony
payments was seen to be of overwhelming importance85 and both proposals
failed to survive the legislative process. 
86
American entry into the war in December of 1941 was followed a few
months later by the first war-time budget. Significantly higher marginal rates
had been proposed and once again the Treasury urged Congress to enact a
measure adopting a joint filing system for married persons.87 It also endorsed
the Senate recommendation of the previous year that recipients, and not
payors, bear the burden of taxes on alimony payments.88 It was suggested that
"rising tax rates [had] in some cases absorbed the entire income of the hus-
band required to pay the tax on his income and that of his divorced wife."1
89
Moreover, it was felt that alimony recipients were unfairly avoiding their fair
share of tax liability by receiving tax-free support payments. 9° Both the
House91 and Senate92 adopted the alimony proposal and it was incorporated
into the 1942 Revenue Bill, which was enacted into law that year. The motiva-
tion for the change was two-fold: to relieve taxpayers of the possible hardship
of paying tax on money that went to a spouse or ex-spouse as alimony or
maintenance payments 93 and to "produce uniformity in the treatment of
amounts paid in the nature of or in lieu of alimony regardless of variance in
the laws of different States concerning the existence and continuance of an
obligation to pay alimony." 94 However, filing did not become law. So, while
separated or divorced spouses were able to achieve a measure of income split-
41d.; Sen. Fin. Comm. Bill §117 (a-c) (1941); remarks of Senator George in 103
Cong. Rec. 7267 (1941).85 It appeared that less than one percent of the total returns filed in the country
represented community-property returns. See s. 673, supra note 83, at 11.86H.R. 1203, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. at 10 (1941).
87Statement by Hon. H. Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, Revenue
Revision of 1942, Hearings Before House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and
Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1 at 9-10 (1942).
88 Statement of Randolph Paul, tax advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury,
Revenue Revision of 1942, Hearings Before the House of Representatives, Committee
on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1 at 92 (1942).
There were many classes of persons who had incurred obligations that had been
negotiated on the assumption that tax rates would remain fairly constant. For example,
many taxpayers had incurred mortgage liabilities based on their after-tax income. Aside
from those paying alimony, no relief was proposed for all the other taxpayers who sud-
denly found that their fixed liabilities and new tax burdens left them with little or no
disposable income.
89 Paul, supra note 88.
90 Id.
91H.R. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. at 46 (1942), reprinted in 2 C.B. 372 at 409-10.
See also Seidman, Seidman's Legislative History of Federal Income and Excess Profits
TaxLaws 1953-1939 (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954) at 1275-86.
92 S. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 83 (1942), reprinted in 2 C.B. 504 at 568-70.
93 H.R., supra note 91.
94 Id. at72.
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ting, those remaining in one household continued to pay higher taxes in non-
community states.95
Tax rates in Canada had risen rapidly following the outbreak of war. Tax-
payers who had enjoyed a relatively low burden of income taxation prior to the
war found themselves paying high marginal rates on low levels of income. The
point at which over half their income went to taxes had dropped from
$300,000 to $15,000 in less than three years, and the minimum rate on their
first taxable dollar had tripled in the same period. 96 The government proposed
further increases in its 1942 budget, although a portion of the increased taxes
were designed to be a form of compulsory savings, refundable after the war.97
There was no indication in the budget speech that the government was con-
sidering any changes to the tax treatment of alimony payments, though it is
likely that Finance Department officials were considering the matter.98
It was almost by accident that the issue entered the budget debate. The
question of divorced persons was raised in the context of dependents' deduc-
tions and a few opposition members commented that it seemed unfair for tax-
payers making alimony payments to shoulder the tax burden on the trans-
ferred income, especially if they were now supporting a second family. 99 It was
suggested that the tax burden might be a factor behind alimony payment
defaults. 100 The Finance Minister agreed it was unjust in many cases and in-
dicated that changes had been proposed in the United States and that his
department had looked at the problem. 101 The discussion was brief and arous-
ed little interest outside the House. 102 But a few weeks later the government
added a resolution to its proposed legislation to tax alimony in the hands of the
95See Rich, Avoiding Tax Traps in Making Alimony Arrangements (1949), 7N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax. 849 at 856; Hesch, Separated Couples and the Marriage Penalty(1980), 45 Albany L. Rev. 116 at 124; Bittker, 3 Federal Taxation of Income, Estates
and Gifts (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1981) at 775; Baum, What is "Inci-dent" to a Divorce: The Problem of Section 22(k) (1954), 12 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax. 507
at 509; Note (1965), 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 992 at 994.96 In 1931 tax rates extended from two percent to fifty percent, with the fifty per-
cent level applying to incomes over $500,000 (R.S.C. 1927, c. 97, Schedule 1, as am. byS.C. 1932, c. 43, s. 11). In 1933 rates varied between three percent and fifty-six percent
and the point at which the fifty percent rate applied had dropped to $300,000 (S.C.1932-33, c. 41, s. 1). An investment income surtax was added in 1934 and remained in
effect until 1942. In 1939 a war surtax of twenty percent of tax payable and a furtherfive percent of tax for incomes over $5,000 was added to the 1933 rates still in effect(S.C. 1939, c. 6, s. 2). By 1940 rates had risen to a range from six percent to seventy-
eight percent and the fifty percent rate was imposed at the $50,000 level (S.C. 1940-41,
c. 18, s. 1). The next year the rates climbed to a range from fifteen percent to eighty-fivepercent and the fifty percent level was reached at $15,000 (S.C. 1940-41, c. 18, s.1).97 Can. H. of C. Deb. June 23, 1942, at 3579-81 [hereinafter Debates].98Less than a month later the Finance Minister responded to an inquiry about
alimony, noting, "much consideration has been given some method by which the law
might be changed. However, I am not in a position at the moment to say whether or not
an amendment to meet the situation will be proposed. The matter is still under con-
sideration." lIsIey, in Debates, July 14, 1942, at 4361.
9 Debates, July 14, 1942, at 4360-61.
ooSee Bence in Debates, id. at 4360.
101 Ilsley in Debates, id. at 4360-61.
'o
2 The Toronto Globe and Mail devoted only two lines to the matter (July 18, 1942
at 1) and the Toronto Daily Star gave it little more coverage (July 18, 1942 at 9).
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recipient. 103 Such amounts were to continue to be taxable in the hands of the
payor. However, the payor was to be allowed a tax credit equal to the amount
of tax that would be payable on the alimony amount in the hands of the reci-
pient if it were the recipient's only income for the year. Opposition members
were quick to point out that the effect of the proposals was to transfer to the
recipient only a small part of the total tax liability on the portion of the payor's
income turned over to the recipient as alimony and they would not provide
relief from the effects of high marginal rates imposed on the amounts in the
payor's hands, as would the changes proposed in the United States. But the
government indicated that it was unwilling to move towards the deduction and
inclusion provisions being considered in Congress. While it was willing to shift
a part of the tax burden, it believed the total taxes paid on the portion of the
taxpayer's income transferred as alimony should remain the same. The
measures finally enacted into law were substantially the same as those first
proposed by the government.'°4
The 1942 provisions provided only modest relief to high income taxpayers'
while those in the lower brackets making smaller alimony payments received
almost no benefit from the changes. 105 In many cases the recipient would pay
little or no tax and no credit would be available to the payor. The government
recognized the problem and two years later proposed a change to a full deduc-
tion for the payor while continuing a full inclusion of such amounts in the reci-
pient's income. 1 06 The resulting provisions were similar to the American enact-
ments of two years earlier and permitted taxpayers to deduct support
10 3 Debates, July 22, 1942, at 4532.
104S.C. 1942-43, c. 28, s. 7(1) specified for the first time that income included
amounts paid as alimony. Subsection 3(2) also included alimony received in income.
Section 11 provided the credit.
105 If an amount paid and received as alimony is to be taxed in the hands of only the
payor or recipient, any change to the method of taxation will create a windfall for one
party and an unanticipated burden for the other. The same is true of changes in the tax
rates.
Take, for example, the taxpayer who negotiated an alimony obligation prior to the
Second World War on the basis of his after-tax income. As taxes rose his fixed alimony
obligation would comprise an increasing portion of his after-tax income. The 1942
changes, to the extent that they shifted some of the tax burden on the alimony payment,
would help to restore the balance of the payor's after-tax income. But the recipient who
had agreed to a lower alimony payment than would otherwise be the case on the
understanding that it would be tax-free suddenly faced a drop in after-tax income. As
tax rates rose during the War, all taxpayers who were unable to increase their incomes
faced decreases in their after-tax income. The issue was how to distribute fairly the
burden of reduced personal consumption due to increased taxation. Both the American
and Canadian proposals accomplished a redistribution of the tax burden. To the extent
that the American provisions provided the payor with a higher after-tax income than the
Canadian, they helped return the taxpayer to the position he was in before the tax rates
rose. If too much relief were provided, the result might have been that his after-tax,
after-alimony income was not substantially different from what it was before the tax in-
crease combined with his alimony obligation to reduce his available income. In this case,
the burden of war-time taxation has been shifted only to the recipient, which is clearly
unfair.
There is no easy solution to the allocation of burdens of reduced consumption due to
high war-time taxation. Measures designed to affect taxpayers who had negotiated
alimony obligations before taxes rose would have an unfair effect on those whose
obligations arose after the taxes started increasing. In these latter cases the alimony
amounts would likely reflect the reduced after-tax income due to war-time conditions
and the amount agreed upon would apportion the burden of higher taxes between the
two parties.
16Debates, June 22, 1944, at 4178.
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payments made pursuant to an order accompanying a divorce decree, judicial
separation or pursuant to a written separation agreement. 107
In 1948 a periodic requirement was added to the deduction provision to
prevent the deduction of lump sum payments. 108 No further changes were
made until 1957 when the sections were modified to include payments made
pursuant to a written agreement (such as a marriage contract) in addition to
those made pursuant to a written separation agreement. 1°9 At this time the
transfer of tax liability on support payments was only available to persons
whose marriage was dissolved or who were separated pursuant to a judicial
order or a separation agreement. A change was made in 1958 to extend the
operation of the transfer provisions to all orders of competent tribunals so that
other maintenance payments similarly qualified for the preferential
treatment. 110
The tax "reform" debate in Canada that followed publication of the
Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation in 1966 devoted almost no at-
tention to the question of support payments. While the Report proposed
sweeping changes in many areas of income tax law, it suggested the tax treat-
ment of support payments "be treated substantially as at present." 111 The only
change recommended was the elimination of the periodic requirement so lump
sum payments could receive like treatment. 112 Most of the Royal Commis-
sion's recommendations concerning family taxation dealt with the proper tax
unit, which the commissioners felt should be composed of married persons
and their dependent children. The family unit, the Report suggested, should be
taxed at a separate rate than individuals. The levels proposed, relative to those
applicable to individuals, were similar to those utilized in the United States
since 1969 for the marital tax unit integral to American income tax law. The
conclusion of the Royal Commission, therefore, was that the transfer of tax
liability on support payments was consistent with the adoption of a family tax
unit whose tax liability was calculated by reference to a separate rate
schedule." 3 The government's response to the Report of the Royal Commis-
10°The credit was repealed and S.C. 1944-45, c. 43, s. 4(8) added a deduction for
the alimony payments. There were some important differences from the American pro-
visions. Amounts specified for child support were deductible under the Canadian law
but not the American. In addition, to qualify for a deduction under the American pro-
visions payments had to be "periodic". In the absence of the same wording in Canada
lump sum payments could qualify for the deduction.
108 S.C. 1948, c. 52, s. ll(1)j).
109 S.C. 1957, c. 29, s. 4(2).
110 S.C. 1958, c. 32, s. 3(2). Court ordered maintenance payments were common in
a number of situations not covered by the provisions. For example, Family Courts often
made support orders based on provincial deserted wives legislation.
" Can., 3 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Report) (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1966) at 130.
112 Id.
113 There is a reference to the alimony and maintenance provisions at one point in
the Carter Report discussing deductions generally that might be interpreted as a sugges-
tion by the Commissioners that the support payments deduction was appropriate in any
case. The Carter Report says, "Under our proposals most expenditures reasonably
related to the production of income would be deductible at some time. We anticipate
that a significant number of the detailed provisions in the Act relating to specific deduc-
tions would cease to be required. However, some provisions for specific deductions
would continue to be necessary because some types of expenditures are not related to
the earning of income, as in the case of alimony and maintenance payments." Supra
note 111, at 88.
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sion on Taxation, Proposals for Tax Reform," 4 rejected the proposal for a
family tax unit and ignored the question of alimony, as did the later reports of
the Senate1 5 and House 16 committees studying tax reform.
The next changes to the alimony provisions occured in 1974 when, in
response to judicial decisions denying deductions for payments made to third
parties, sections were added authorizing the deduction of these amounts as
long as they remained an allowance in nature. 
117
It had been held that the alimony and maintenance transfer sections ap-
plied only to persons who were or had been legally married. 118 With the reform
of provincial family laws in the last half of the 1970s, pressure grew for a
modification of the income tax treatment of support payments so that persons
deemed spouses for the purpose of support obligations imposed by provincial
law could receive treatment similar to that accorded those whose support
obligation arose out of an existing or dissolved marriage.1 9 The Act was
amended in 1980 to achieve the sought-after parity.120 In 1981 the provisions
dealing with payments to third parties were amended to ensure that only
payments in the nature of an allowance would qualify for a deduction. 121
There have been no further changes to the support provisions since that
time. 122
C. The Ideal Tax Treatment of Support Payments
1. Consequences to the Payor when Traditional Support Doctrines are
Applied
The nebulous character of support payments offers little guidance to the
appropriate tax treatment of the amounts in the payor's hands. Some explana-
tions for the obligation are analogous to expenditures about which there is
general agreement as to the correct tax treatment. But other reasons have no
counterparts in the transactions with which the income tax system usually
deals, which could be used as models for determining the suitable tax treat-
ment of these transfers. In the end, the ideal treatment of support payments
will not rest on some inherent quality of the payment itself. Instead it will be
necessary to recognize that, whatever the rationale for the obligation, it is an
incident of certain relationships and the tax treatment should not turn on why
the obligation exists but on how it is incurred.
114 Can., Dept. of Finance, Proposals for Tax Reform (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1969) at 14-15. (The report was popularly known as "The White Paper on Taxation"
and is often referred to by this title.)
11s Can., Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Report
on The White Paper Proposals for Tax Reform (Ottawa, 1970).
116 Can., Standing (House) Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs,
Report Respecting the White Paper on Tax Reform (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).
117 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 26, ss. 28, 31."
Il'Murdock v. Minister of National Revenue (1965), 39 Tax A.B.C. 97, 19 D.T.C.
541; McGrath v. Minister of National Revenue, [1979] C.T.C. 3146, 79 D.T.C. 912
(T.R.B.).
119 See, e.g., Suzuki, Recommendations of the Family Law Section Committee on
Income Tax and the Family (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association - Ontario, 1979) at 5.
120 S.C. 1980-81, c. 48, s. 25(3), 29(2).
121Id. s. 30. See text accompanying note 206, infra.
122For a more detailed look at the income tax transfer provisions and their treat-
ment by the courts, see the sources cited in notes 212 to 220, infra.
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There are a number of explanations for the support obligation that have
been offered in the past which, were they still applicable, would leave little
room for a proposition that such amounts should not be taxed in the payor's
hands. For example, if alimony "merely continues the support which the wife
was entitled to receive while the marriage existed," 123 there would be no reason
to permit a deduction of payments made at the end of a marriage where none
was allowed before. Similarly, if alimony was seen as "furnishing damages for
the husband's wrongful breach of the marriage contract," 124 or if it were "a
penalty imposed on the guilty husband", 125 it would be difficult to view the
payments as anything but consumption expenses of the payor. However, as ex-
plained earlier, the extension of the right to support to both sexes, its applica-
tion to relationships other than legal marriages, and the growing unimportance
of conduct as a factor in setting the quantity and initial qualification for sup-
port awards all serve to demonstrate that these explanations are no longer
viable rationale for the obligation.
A more contemporary explanation for the support obligation, the implied
contract theory, would, if valid, offer one of the clearest cases for concluding
that the payments represent consumption expenditures of the payor for which
no deduction should be permitted. The implied contract theory of support sug-
gests that spousal relationships involve an implicit understanding that if family
responsibilities are divided so that one spouse assumes the income earning
responsibility and the other attends to household responsibilities such as caring
for children, the spouse working outside of the home will support the one re-
maining in the home. A further feature of the implied contract is an under-
standing that if the relationship should end, the working spouse will support
the other spouse, or at least compensate him or her for the loss of economic
potential he or she suffered by spending time with household responsibilities
instead of participating in the labour force and accruing skills, experience and
seniority. 126 The emphasis in recent legislation on the obligation to be self-
sufficient, the possibility to contract out of a support obligation, and the use
of support payments as a bridge to re-entry into the workforce all add strength
to the implied contract view of the support responsibility. At the same time,
however, the obligation has been extended to many situations where the need
of the party seeking support is attributable to circumstances that have little or
nothing to do with the relationship that gave rise to the claim for support. The
imposition of a duty to support in instances that were clearly beyond the con-
templation of the parties at the time the relationship began tends to undermine
the implied contract theory and show that it is inapplicable to many support
cases. If support payments were, in fact, made pursuant to an express or im-
plied contract, they could be treated similarly to any personal expenses of the
payor made under contract. The income tax system does not generally inquire
whether or not the beneficiary of a contract has struck a good bargain and
123 Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States (St. Paul, Minn.:
West, 1968) at 421.
124Id. at 421-33.
12 Id. at 422; Home, Tax Pitfalls in Alimony and Separation Payments (1957), 35
Taxes 751.
126 "We believe that a woman does not become economically dependent by virtue
of her marriage. If she is in fact dependent, it is the couple's personal choice." Can.,
Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1970) at 299.
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received full value in exchange for the consideration offered, but taxes all con-
sumption expenditures in the hands of the payor. Given its inapplicability in so
many situations, however, this theory of support is an inadequate explanation
for the obligation and should not serve as the basis for developing rules to
govern the taxation of support payments.
It is apparent that no one rationale adequately explains the support
obligation in its many forms and situations. If we turn to the initial step that a
person must take to become potentially liable for a support obligation,
however, it is possible to discover the thread running through the many in-
stances in which the obligation arises. The common denominator for all sup-
port obligations is the underlying relationship from which they flow. They are
imposed only on persons who are legally spouses or are deemed to be spouses
by virtue of a marital-like relationship. While we may be at a loss to under-
stand why the obligation arose, we can see how it came about. For the persons
on either side of a support obligation it really does not matter whether it is bas-
ed on any of the explanations discussed earlier or is simply a desire by the state
to utilize the relationship as an excuse to pass along an obligation that would
otherwise fall on the public purse. The legislatures have decided that an obliga-
tion should attach to all relationships meeting certain criteria, an obligation
that will not ripen until the relationship ends, at which time it will crystallize
only if certain criteria relied upon by the courts (or individuals reaching an
out-of-court settlement) are present. Persons entering into marital or marital-
like relationships are actually, or are deemed to be, aware that one of the
potential consequences of the relationship is a support obligation.127 If cir-
cumstances evolve so that a taxpayer is later required to make support
payments, they might be treated as transfers made pursuant to a personal
undertaking agreed to implicitly at the time the relationship commenced. The
initial control of the transferor permits us to consider the amount he or she
earns and then transfers to others the consumption of the taxpayer. 128
While the simple way to resolve the appropriate tax treatment of support
payments is to assert that they are consumption expenses of the payor and,
therefore, part of the payor's taxable income, there are many aspects of the
127 The analysis does not turn on whether or not the parties are actually aware of
the potential obligation. They are expected to understand the legal consequences of the
actions they contemplate or to learn about them before commencing the act that might
give rise to an obligation. This principle is firmly established in almost all areas of law.
For example, tort law imposes liability on the person who is aware of her negligence or
who should have been aware of the potential consequences of her actions.
128 Of course this conclusion is based on the assumption outlined earlier that a pro-
gressive income tax system seeks to redistribute economic potential. If the goal were a
redistribution of consumption, a lower tax burden for the transferor is reasonable. For
example, Vickrey believes that a degree of income splitting for marital units with only
one earner might be appropriate. He suggests a case "can be made for reducing the tax
where two persons of unequal incomes live in a common household and share their
resources: this sharing of resources can be considered a redistribution of income similar
to that which the income tax is attempting to bring about." Vickrey, Agenda for Pro-
gressive Taxation (New York: Roland Press, 1947) at 280.
Similarly, the conclusion relies on a definition of income that equates consumption
with economic command, not actual physical consumption or benefit. As McIntyre
points out, "the alimony deduction is a necessary corollary of the benefit rule. "Mcln-
tyre, Individual Filing in the Personal Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion(1980), 58 N.C. L. Rev. 469 at 478.
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support obligation that make it a rather unusual alienation of income. It is
possible to treat the payments as we would any other income transfer but in
many respects the doctrine of control normally applicable to these transfers
provides an awkward mold into which support payments should fit. Support
payments may result from an initial consumption choice of the payor, but it
might be asked whether they continue to remain acts of consumption forever.
And even if they do represent the consumption of the payor, there may be
features of support payments that make it appropriate to treat them differently
from other consumption expenditures that take the form of income
assignments. Income assignments usually occur within a family and transfers
outside the family are likely to be for short periods of time. Support payments,
however, are long-term assignments occuring outside family. All these factors
make support a harder case than some other income transfers. However, on
close analysis, they fail to establish a convincing case for not including these
amounts in the tax base of the payor.
a) For How Long are Support Payments the Payor's Consumption?
While lump sum support payments or support obligations lasting for a
fixed period of time are not uncommon, most support orders and agreements
extend for an indefinite period of time, although they may be terminable upon
the passing of specified events such as remarriage of the recipient. Taxpayers
might wonder how far down the line these financial consequences are deemed
to be their consumption because they flow from an original consumption
choice.
A similar long-term expense whose nature is often discussed is that of
child-care costs. The issue debated is whether all subsequent child-rearing ex-
penses should be considered consumption of the person who originally com-
mitted the act that led to the conception of the child. Many commentators
believe this is the case. 129 The child-care expense issue can be resolved,
however, by pointing out that whatever consumption element there is in the ex-
penditure, there might also be a business purpose if the expenses are incurred
to enable someone to work. Unlike other personal expenses such as food and
clothing that must be incurred whether or not the taxpayer is working, child-
care expenses are incurred only when the person caring for the child seeks to
return to the workforce. 130 In the case of child-care expenses it might still be
debated what effect this factor should have on the original characterization of
the expenses as a personal consumption expenditure of the payor.13 1 In any
129 See, e.g., Klein, Tax Deductions for Family Care Expenses (1973), 14 Boston
College Ind. and Comm. L. Rev. 917 at 941: "[Tlhe cost of caring for children can be
thought of as a voluntary outlay - as a matter of consumption, if you Will."
130The Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation concluded that child care ex-
penses were nondiscretionary outlays of the taxpayer where both parents were working.
Supra note 111, at 34, 193.
131 It should have no effect on that characterization according to some. See, e.g.,
McIntyre, Evaluating the New Tax Credit for Child Care and Maid Services (1977), 5
Tax Notes 7 at 8:
No one would suggest that the costs of caring for a pet elephant are deductible,
simply because it is impossible to go to work and leave the elephant alone. What
made child care expenses different was that a parent, after making the quintessen-
tial personal choice to have a child, could not undo that decision by giving the child
to the local zoo. This difference, however, is not sufficient to convert child care in-
to a business deduction within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.
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event, no business purpose can be imputed to support payments 132 and a case
for deductability of these expenses cannot be based on a dual-purpose type of
analysis. 133
If support payments do not acquire a secondary purpose along the route
that would help shift them from pure consumption expenses of the payor,
there remains one further possibility that might be utilized to move the expen-
ditures from a taxable to a non-taxable consumption category. While the
broadest understanding of the Haig-Simons income definition recognizes no
expenses as necessary deductions from taxable income other than those incur-
red to earn further income, 134 another view of the optimal comprehensive tax
base would permit taxpayers to deduct non-discretionary expenses over which
they had no control. 135 If it could be shown that support payments cease to be
discretionary at some point, then a deduction for the payments would be ap-
propriate under this view of the ideal tax base.
The argument in favour of narrowing a person's tax base from potential
economic power to "discretionary economic power" is based on a belief that it
would not be fair to tax a person on income that was used to pay certain ex-
penses which were not incurred as a result of a voluntary consumption choice.
Unanticipated, costly medical expenses are perhaps the best example of ex-
penses that are considered to be non-discretionary by advocates of this nar-
rower tax base.136 Leaving aside for the moment the merits of an exemption
from taxable income for non-discretionary outlays, it is clear that in any case
an unexpected illness or accident is quite different from a support obligation
resulting from a personal arrangement into which the payor deliberately
entered. A discretionary economic power tax base only becomes relevant to the
132However, the Canadian deduction provision and, since 1976, its American
counterpart both operate as deductions from gross income similar to business expenses,
unlike personal deductions which are subtracted at a later stage to calculate taxable in-
come. See Bashinsky, Income Taxation: The Tax Reform Act of 1976 Changes in the
Treatment of Individual Taxpayer's Alimony and Child Care Payments (1978), 9
Cumberland L. Rev. 177 at 179.
Goode, supra note 14, at 148, includes support payments in a list of deductions, the
"dominant reason" for which is "an allowance of costs of obtaining income." It is not
clear to what extent he attributes this purpose to all the items in his list.
133 An additional innovative and theoretical justification for the child care deduc-
tion (which operates as a credit in the United States) is that of McIntyre and Oldman,
who claim a deduction is called for "to equalize the tax treatment of purchased child-
care services and self-performed services by in effect making both kinds of services ex-
empt from tax." McIntyre and Oldman, "Treatment of the Family," in Pechman, ed.,
Comprehensive Income Taxation (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977) 205 at
225. Equalizing the treatment of extra-family support with intra-family support would,
of course, require taxing both or neither.
134 This is the view Professor Surrey uses as the base for establishing his tax expen-
diture budget. Beginning with Simons' definition, he says, "Consumption in this ap-
proach is thus all funds spent except where spent in the earning or production of in-
come - since the tax is on net income." Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform, supra note
27, at 21.
135 See, e.g., supra note 111, at 5, 34; Bittker, Income Tax Reform in Canada: The
Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (1967), 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 637 at 638-45;
Kahn, Personal Deductions in the Federal Income Tax (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1960) at 13.
136 See, e.g., supra note 111, at 213-19.
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issue of support payments if it can be demonstated that at some point such
payments are no longer attributable to a voluntary commitment of the payor.
To support such a contention is not an easy task. Ultimately, of course, the ex-
pense can be traced to an intentional consumption choice of the payor. 137 But
is it fair to continue labelling support payments consumption of the payor
years after that original commitment? 138 To do so implies that the only way a
taxpayer can avoid the possibility of an obligation that might require payments
which will be considered to be voluntary consumption outlays for the rest of
her or his life is to live a solitary existence and avoid any acts that might make
one an actual or deemed spouse. 139
There is no demarcation point set out in tax theory or practice that can be
utilized to help resolve the dilemma. Family law, which imposed the obligation
in the first place, similarly fails to establish criteria that could be used to
distinguish discretionary from non-discretionary payments. A potential sup-
port obligation has been made an incident of certain relationships and may
crystallize after the relationship ends once certain factors are considered. The
form of the obligation can range from one lump sum payment through to an
indefinite commitment that may be modified or terminated as the conditions
under which it was originally imposed alter. The evolution of support from a
discretionary to non-discretionary obligation is not one of the factors con-
sidered when the amount and duration of the payments is determined.
The only analogous situation confronted by family and tax law is that of
support payments in a family that has not dissolved. At the time a person
enters into a family relationship he or she assumes a support obligation' 4° that
is treated as a consumption choice of the payor throughout the life of the rela-
tionship. While one could distinguish support in an existing family from
similar payments between persons who no longer live in one household, it is
hard to conceive of a basis for distinction that would justify differing tax treat-
ment of the two types of transfers. For example, if it were assumed that every
137 As Klein said of child care expenses, "The expense is necessary at a given point
in time only because the couple had previously made a decision to have children."
Klein, supra note 129, at 938.
138 Bittker's argument in favour of a recognition of child support expenses as non-
discretionary may be equally applicable to support payments to a spouse or ex-spouse.
As to children, Bittker said, supra note 22, at 1448:
To be sure, nobody forced the taxpayer to procreate, but this does not mean that
the cost of supporting children is no more entitled to legal recognition than the cost
of maintaining a yacht. For one thing, the decision to have children is irreversible;
they cannot be abandoned, like a hobby that has become burdensome or boring.
Moreover, society feels an obligation to support the children - but not the hob-
by - if the taxpayer is unable to do so. No one but a tax theorist, it might be
asserted, could fail to see the difference. For these reasons, it is argued, the tax-
payer's taxpaying capacity is reduced by parenthood (and, in most circumstances,
by the support of other dependents) to a degree that should be reflected in his tax
liability.
131 The taxpayer can also contract out of a potential obligation before committing
those acts.
140The common law duty is now codified. See, e.g., Family Law Reform Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 145, s. 15; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 197. Of course ac-
tion to enforce the obligation is rare when parties cohabit, unlike the situation where
persons seek to enforce an obligation to support a separated or divorced spouse.
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year in which a couple does not separate the person supporting the unit has
made an implicit affirmation of his or her original consumption choice, then
from the taxpayer's perspective intra-family support is a discretionary ex-
pense, while payments made after separation are no longer voluntary, given
the payor's renunciation of the original consumption choice. However, the in-
come tax system does not permit each taxpayer to choose the point at which
expenses should be considered non-discretionary. If the payments were con-
sidered personal consumption of the payor until separation, repudiation of the
relationship that gave rise to the obligation cannot make subsequent payments
involuntary outlays. We do not draw such a line with any other consumption
choice - neither the taxpayer who buys a yacht and changes her mind after a
year nor the taxpayer who pledges a gift under seal and who no longer wishes
to make the donation is permitted to treat payments subsequent to the change
of heart as involuntary outlays that should be deducted from income. While
support obligations tend to last longer than many other consumption choices,
no convincing reason can be offered for treating the expenditures differently
from those incurred for a short-term responsibility. "Involuntary" and "non-
discretionary" are terms that are defined for tax purposes by criteria other
than the motivation of the taxpayer.
Many persons believe that a fair comprehensive tax base should measure
only a taxpayer's discretionary economic power. An income tax system using
this base would allow a taxpayer to exclude from taxable income a number of
involuntary payments. Involuntary does not mean the taxpayer did not want
to make the payment - a taxpayer might not "want" to make a payment on
her mortgage or car - but that they result from an obligation which was not
voluntarily incurred by the taxpayer. Support payments clearly are not in-
voluntary in that sense of the word and should be taxable in the payor's hands
regardless of whether a broad or a narrow comprehensive tax base is utilized.
b) Do Support Payments Merit Special Treatment Not Accorded Other
Consumption Expenditures?
The conclusion that support payments should be considered taxable in-
come of the payor was supported in part by caselaw and statutory provisions
which established a definition of income that ignored the effect of income
assignments for tax purposes. The treatment of income assignments helped to
illustrate the doctrine that equated consumption with initial control over in-
come. If it can be demonstrated that the goals of the income assignment prin-
ciples would not be endangered by failing to strictly apply the rules that were
developed to deal with these earlier concerns to support payments, there may
be no need to tax these amounts as we would all other consumption expenses
of the taxpayer. The reason we might seek to differentiate support payments
from other income transfers is the fact that they are made out of the family
and, at the same time, are based on an obligation that may last as long as intra-
family commitments.
Both the American income assignment doctrines and the Canadian
statutory provisions, which ignore income assignments when computing tax
liability, are directed at intra-family transfers. It is possible that the doctrine
which equates consumption with control over income evolved as it did because
the courts and legislators were addressing concerns that only apply to intra-
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family transfers. 141 Neither the United States nor Canada used a spousal tax
unit at the time the income assignment doctrines were developed, although the
United States subsequently adopted such a unit, and implicit in the court deci-
sions and legislation may be an unarticulated belief that notwithstanding the
decision to treat each individual as a separate tax unit, families act as one
economic unit and the transferor will always continue to benefit from any
transfer within a family, even if the recipient constitutes a separate unit for tax
purposes. 142 If this was the real motivation for the broad definition of income,
there is no reason for the doctrine to continue to apply to support payments
made only after the family has dissolved.
The obvious way to determine the appropriate treatment of transfers
made outside the family is to consider a payment to someone with no present
or past connections to the payor. If the payor should not be relieved of tax on
the transferred amount in this case, surely it should be treated as the payor's
income where it arises out of a family obligation. This type of transfer was
briefly discussed earlier. It was pointed out that apart from a limited deduction
for certain charitable contributions designed to encourage such donations, the
general structure of the tax system ignores any effect on the payor's taxable in-
come even where the payor and recipient were completely unconnected.
However, the extent to which the donor controls income that is transferred as a
charitable contribution is not difficult to observe - the assignment is usually a
short-term, one shot occurence (although it may be repeated in later years). Is
the argument in favour of imputing transferred income to the transferor for
tax purposes as convincing in the case of a long-term transfer, which is not
made within a family context, where the original commitment was entirely
gratuitous?
The situation in which this type of transfer would be most likely to occur
outside of a family is in the case of a member of a religious order who has
assigned her income to the order to which she belongs pursuant to a vow of
perpetual poverty. Like many support obligations, these assignments are of an
indefinite duration. However, aside from the length of time involved, these
transfers do not differ greatly from other charitable donations and a longer
duration of an obligation is not in itself a sufficient reason to consider
amounts that are usually taxable to be non-taxable. And yet, the legislature
has responded to the case of the person transferring all her income pursuant to
a vow of perpetual poverty and relieved these persons of tax liability on the
transferred amounts.
The subject was first addressed by the United States Congress in 1924
when the deduction for charitable donations was amended to permit an
unlimited deduction for persons regularly giving away substantially all of their
incomes to charity. The change was apparently introduced for the benefit of
141 In Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), a taxpayer established an ir-
revocable trust for his wife, in which he retained significant power over the trust proper-
ty in his role as trustee. In a decision that helped establish the American attribution rules
with regard to transfers to trusts, the American Supreme Court held the grantor/trustee
taxable on income received by his wife, the beneficiary of the trust. Douglas J. noted, at
335, that the arrangement was "at best a temporary reallocation of income within an in-
timate family group."
14. Siegel, TaxProblems of the Family (1945), 3 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax. 175 at 180.
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an order of nuns whose vows required them to turn over their incomes to their
church. 143 The provision was designed to accommodate persons who habitually
donated almost all their incomes 144 and it is clear that a major concern of Con-
gress was to provide relief to the person who, after turning over her income to
the charity, had nothing left with which to pay taxes. A taxpayer could have
easily found herself in this predicament prior to the Second World War when
there was no withholding of taxes at the source.
A Canadian provision designed to provide the same relief was introduced
in 1949.145 While the Canadian provision remains in the Act, its counterpart in
the United States has since been repealed. The Canadian provision is tightly
drafted - it applies only to members of a religious order who have taken a
vow of perpetual poverty. 146 The American deduction, however, was available
to all taxpayers for all charitable donations and became the source of
widespread abuse as wealthy taxpayers were able to donate untaxed income to
charities and shelter all taxable income with the resulting deduction. 147
Is the perpetual vow deduction a tax expenditure or is it instead an ap-
plication of an income refinement concept, not encountered previously, which
might be applicable to support payments? Leaving aside for the present other
possible arguments in favour of a deduction not directly related to our concern
(for example, the proposition that a duty to one's Lord is not voluntary in the
usual sense of that word), the issue confronted is whether the income assign-
ment doctrine should apply even in the case of the taxpayer who transfers all
of her income. In other words, is there a quantitative point after which
assignments should no longer be considered consumption of the payor? Ap-
plying the analysis developed earlier, one would conclude that the income of
the donor does not vary whether five percent or ninety-five percent of her
earnings are given away. The economic command is the same in both cases and
the only factor that differentiates these two situations is the extent to which the
taxpayers personally consumed or passed on to others to consume. The effect
of Parliament's decision to grant a larger deduction for the taxpayer transfer-
ring a larger portion of income is not to more accurately measure the tax-
payers' incomes, but rather to grant a larger subsidy to one taxpayer than the
other (which, in the case of the perpetual vow donor, is passed on to the
ultimate consumer, the religious order that will actually use the amount in the
market). 148
In some ways the provisions in the Act dealing with support transfers
parallel those for charitable contributions. Parliament has concluded that
143 See Rudick and Gray, Bounty Twice Blessed: Tax Consequences of Gifts of
Property to or in Trust for Charity (1961), 16 Tax L. Rev. 273 at 274, n. 4; Merten (rev.
by Doheny and Calvert), Mertens Law of Federal Income Tax (Wilmette, Ill.:
Callaghan & Co.) at §31.03b, n. 3.
144 S. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., at 24 (1924).
145 S.C. 1949, c. 25, s. 11(6).
146 Subsection 110(2) in the Act.
147 See Rudick and Gray, supra note 143; statement by Stanley S. Surrey before
House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at
1612(1969).
148 The Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation recommended that the provision
be abolished. Supra note 111, at 226.
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there is something unique about income transfers for these purposes too and,
accordingly, has stipulated the relief it thinks is appropriate. The resulting
legislation permits taxpayers a fixed deduction of $1,400 for support provided
to a spouse, 149 a provision that is often less generous than that provided for
charitable donations which allows a deduction of up to twenty percent of in-
come. For some Canadian families the deduction might equal the actual
amount of support received by the non-working spouse. For many, however,
the deduction is a small percentage of the support amount. This can be con-
trasted with support payments to persons living separately from the payor
where, under the present system, the entire amount is deductible, 150 as is the
case with perpetual vow donations.
It might be argued that Parliament has addressed the issue of support
payments twice - once in the case of support within a family and once in the
case of payments made after the dissolution of the family. However, the ques-
tion of the appropriate treatment of support has really only been looked at
once. The provisions applicable to support payments outside of a contem-
porary family were not designed to achieve a legislative goal with regard to
support. Instead, they were intended to provide relief to a specific group of
taxpayers, whose support and tax liabilities had combined with high wartime
marginal rates to leave them wvith little or no after-tax income, and to distrib-
ute the burden of reduced personal consumption due to war taxation between
the giving and receiving parties. There is no evidence whatsoever that the
retention of these provisions after the war was designed to achieve a different
legislative goal. It was simply a case of inertia where the status quo was main-
tained long after the rationale for the rule was no longer valid. Thus, we
should consider the rules regarding support payments within a family as the
only time at which Parliament specifically addressed the need for exceptions to
the usual tax rules for the case of income transferred in the form of support.
Parliament's response, a $1,400 deduction for support payments, is deliberately
limited, in contrast to the present rule which allows taxpayers an unlimited
deduction for amounts used to support former mates, an expenditure that is
essentially the same type of transfer in both cases.
In some respects support payments appear to sit on the margin of "con-
sumption". Even if they sit on the taxable side of that line, as has been sug-
gested, they do represent a somewhat unique situation. Although these facts
combine to make the choice of appropriate tax treatment of support more dif-
ficult than might otherwise be the case, amounts paid pursuant to a support
obligation remain the consumption of the payor and a deduction for these
payments is not desireable in a normative income tax. The government might
want to take the factors mentioned above, along with any others it feels to be
important, and decide to help subsidize these income transfers. And although
the motivation for the original alimony deduction is no longer applicable, the
149 Subsection 109(l)(a)(ii) provides for a $1,400 deduction for a dependent spouse.
This figure has been indexed to a cost of living formula since 1974. In September 1982,
the government announced that the indexing factor for the next two years would be six
and five percent respectively, regardless of actual rises in the cost of living above those
amounts, as part of an anti-inflation programme.
150 But not all payments to persons receiving support are deductible - just those
that go to spouses or ex-spouses. In the case of other blood relatives supported by the
taxpayer a deduction ranging from $300 to $1,400 applies. See s. 109(b)-(h) of the Act.
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government may wish to provide a greater level of subsidy for taxpayers pro-
viding support to a person with whom he or she is not cohabiting. The subsidy
nature of these measures should be recognized, however, so that equitable
results can be achieved.
2. Consequences to the Parties Applying the Support as a Return on an
Investment in Human Capital Doctrine
Thus far, it has been suggested that two principles should govern the
treatment of various income and property transfers between spouses or ex-
spouses. To review, the paper began with the proposition that earned income
or property income should be taxed in the hands of the person who labours or
who controls property, whether he or she consumes with the income or assigns
it to another person. Second, it was suggested that income should follow
beneficial ownership of property. When property is transferred, subsequently
generated income should be taxed in the hands of the new owner whether the
property was purchased or received as a gift.
The different treatment of income earned by one who labours or owns
property and transfers the income and income generated by property that has
itself been transferred raises an interesting problem - how should support
payments be treated if they are considered income from property belonging to
ihe recipient, that property being a share of the human capital of the payor? If
a support award is actually a return on an investment in the earning capacity of
the working spouse, it might be argued that it should be taxed as income to the
recipient and at the same time be excluded from the income of the transferor.
There are many instances in which a court hearing a matrimonial dispute
that involves conflicting claims to a particular property may conclude it is
preferable not to sell the property and divide the proceeds. Such is the case, for
example, where the asset consists of an on-going business that would not sur-
vive were a portion of its capital taken out of the operation. An alternative ex-
ample is that of a property earning a healthy return but whose value is based
on a large accrued and unrealized gain where it is desirable to defer recognition
of the gain as long as possible. In these cases a court will usually transfer legal
title to a portion of the asset and permit the present legal owner to continue to
operate the business or manage the property, as the case may be. That person
must forward to the new co-owner a portion of the profits generated by the
property equal to the share of ownership held by the recipient partner.
It is not possible, of course, to vest legal title to a portion of human capital
in another person. Although such an order cannot be made in form, it is possi-
ble to achieve the practical consequences such an order would accomplish,
were it technically possible. A support order based on a portion of the payor's
earnings might be seen as a substitute for an order that transferred ownership
of a portion of property but permitted the former owner the right to continue
to manage the property. In both cases the owner or manager transfers that part
of the income that is equal to the share of the new owner in the property. 151
While legal title to property that takes the form of human capital cannot be
transferred, perhaps a beneficial interest in the property can be. This could be
151 In the case of spousal transfers, if the amount transferred is property income, it
will be taxed in the hands of the recipient who now owns the property that generated it
because the attribution rules that normally apply to spousal transfers (supra note 37)
cease to operate after the end of a relationship.
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accomplished through a support order. It is arguable that the beneficial
"owner" of the property should be taxed on the income generated by the
"property" and the nominal owner should not be taxed on the income
generated by the "property" and the nominal owner should not be taxed on
income over which he or she had no control, but instead should be treated like
a conduit or the vehicle for operating another taxpayer's property. If support
is a return on an investment in human capital, the inability to transfer legal ti-
tle because of the peculiar nature of the property should not alter its tax status
as property income. 152 But despite its apparent validity as a logical and consis-
tent application of the principles governing the taxation of "property" in-
come, this conclusion is based on a flawed reasoning process. It is a fine exam-
ple of the process once referred to as the "fallacy of the transplanted
category," 153 or the error of applying concepts suitable in one area of law to
another with different objectives.
To explain this assertion, the following part of the paper will first explore
the theory of human capital and its role in family relationships, then review
briefly the extent to which it is a factor in family dissolution proceedings, and
finally show that the application of the principles upon which the human
capital theory is premised to family law concerns is not important to those
seeking to categorize these income transfers for income tax purposes.
a) The Economic Theory of Human Capital
The theory that suggests support may be a return to the recipient on an in-
vestment in property (human capital) held by the payor for the benefit of the
recipient is based on a view of a family as a rational economic unit. It com-
mences with the individual participants in that unit who are each presumed to
expect to be better off following an exchange of services and a division of
labour. 154 Thus economists presume that the division of labour and respon-
sibilities in a household is designed to maximize the return to the household
and both parties expect to enjoy increased future consumption from the ar-
rangement. 155 As a result of the divided family functions, one or both parties
152 When the Canadian Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1917, c. 28 imposed a surcharge
on investment income, support payments received were considered investment income.
They are now defined as "earned income" for the purpose of calculating contribution
limits to a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (see s. 146(l)(c) of the Act). The United
Kingdom continues to consider maintenance payments exceeding a fixed amount of in-
vestment income for the purpose of an investment income surcharge. See Tiley,
Revenue Law (London: Butterworths, 1978) at 142. For a brief discussion of the
arguments for and against considering these amounts investment income see Willis and
Hardwick, Tax Expenditures in the United Kingdom (London: Heinemann Educational
Books, 1978) at 72.
1531 borrow the phrase from Moffatt Hancock's classic article, The Fallacy of the
Transplanted Category (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev. 535.
154 Most economic theory is based on an assumption that this is the case with any
exchange of property rights, obligations or responsibilities. See Pejovich, Towards a
General Theory of Property Rights (1971), 31 Zeitschrift ftir National-6konomie (Heft
1-2) 141, reprinted in Furubotn and Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights (Cam-
bridge: Ballinger, 1974) 341 at 344.
155 See, "Division of Labour in Households and Families," in Becker, 2 A Treatise
on the Family (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981); Krasukopf, Recompense for
Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human
Capital (1980), 28 Kansas L. Rev. 379 at 386-88; Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce:
Social Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards (1981), 28
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1181 at 1211.
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may be able to acquire one or more of three types of assets: tangible assets, in-
tangible but marketable assets, and property personal to the holder that can be
used in the future to generate a stream of income, that is, human capital.
Almost all of the common law separate property regimes in North America
have incorporated sharing into their divorce laws,.156 but the extent to which
courts in these jurisdictions have recognized a right of the non-owning spouse
to the three different forms of property varies.
Canadian courts have definitely recognized two ways in which a non-
owning spouse might acquire an interest in the tangible assets owned by the
other spouse, as a result of which they may order a transfer of assets or other
compensation. First, the non-owning spouse may have contributed money or
money's worth directly to the acquisition or growth of the transferred property
or a predecessor property. Second, the transferee might have freed the other
spouse from household responsibilities which allowed the working spouse
more time to devote to the acquisition of assets. In the latter case the spouse
who remained in the home will have contributed nothing to the disputed
assets. However, when household and child rearing responsibilities are assum-
ed by one person, that person must forego the opportunity to acquire non-
family assets at the same time the spouse who is working outside of the home is
able to accumulate these assets. This division of family functions will leave
both parties with equal responsibilities but unequal opportunities and this fact
is recognized by the courts. As a result, the non-working spouse is often
awarded a portion of the other spouse's assets based on this shifting of
opportunities. 157
While a court can divide the assets of one spouse who was able to acquire
the property because the other spouse undertook those responsibilities that af-
156 Canadian reform followed the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Murdoch
v. Murdoch, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423, 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367, [19741 1 W.W.R. 361. For a
review of the parallel American developments see Cheadle, The Development of Shar-
ing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States (1981), 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
1269 at 1280-83.
157 See, e.g., Boardman v. Boardman (1977), 2 R.F.L. (2d) 156 at 162 (Sask. Q.B.):
"Much of what the doctor has today in a material sense is attributable as much to his
wife's help and assistance, as it is to his own industry and initiative. She has contributed
considerably in caring for the home, and has, both prior and subsequent to separation,
cared for the children." Another example is Bregman v. Bregman (1978), 21 O.R. (2d)
722 at 739, 91 D.L.R. (3d) 470 at 487, 7 R.F.L. (2d) 201 at 218 (Ont. H.C.), aff'd
without written reasons (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 254, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 703 (C.A.): "[S]he
was, as I find, the marriage partner who took the main burden of responsibility of
household management and child care. I am in no doubt that this left her husband
physically, intellectually and mentally free to concentrate as much as he required to
earning and acquiring and managing his non-family assets." It is interesting to note that
Mrs. Bregman had the assistance of housekeepers and "charwomen" in carrying out
those household responsibilities.
The distinctive nature of the two types of contributions a non-working spouse can
make is well illustrated by the decision in Silverstein v. Silverstein (1978), 20 O.R. (2d)
185, 87 D.L.R. (3d) 116, 1 R.F.L. (2d) 239 (Ont. H.C.). Mrs. Silverstein was awarded a
twenty-five percent interest in a rental property owned by her husband in recognition of
her indirect contribution towards the acquisition of the property. She had worked in her
husband's store without a salary and had provided money for the purchase of another
property. The proceeds of the sale of that property were invested into the rental proper-
ty that was divided. Mrs. Silverstein also undertook the bulk of household respon-
sibilities which permitted her husband to acquire assets that were traced to the rental
property. In recognition of this she was granted a further twenty-five percent interest in
the property.
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forded no opportunity to acquire property, it is much more difficult to divide
the intangibles that the working spouse also acquired over the same time.
Nevertheless, this property can be valued and taken into account when the
assets of the two parties are compared. The opportunity to acquire tangible
assets is not the only benefit realized by the working spouse as a result of the
assumption of the income earning part of the family duties. Whether that
spouse runs a business, develops a professional practice or builds a career, the
same time and effort that permit the acquisition of assets also permit the
building up of business, finding new clients, establishing goodwill, ac-
cumulating experience, seniority and tenure; in short, as the working spouse
earns and saves income, he or she also builds the base for future income. If the
assumption of household responsibilities entitles a spouse to a portion of the
real assets acquired by the working spouse, it should similarly entitle that per-
son to a claim on these intangible assets. This will not prove a problem in com-
mon law sharing jurisdictions where a court can estimate the value of this
property and take it into account when dividing property unevenly. 158 In com-
munity property jurisdictions, however, the accumulation of this property
must be divided equally and it must therefore be accurately valued. It is not
surprising, therefore, that jurisdictions such as California consider goodwill,
the amount by which a person's business or professional practice exceeds the
tangible assets invested therein, a community property that must be divided
upon matrimonial dissolution, 159 notwithstanding the problems that may be
encountered in valuing the asset. 160
Canadian courts have not yet explicitly recognized a spouse's interest in
the human capital property of the other spouse that has not produced income
at the time of the dissolution. American courts have explored the respective
rights of parties to share in this property, however, and their decisions provide
a useful introduction to the concepts involved. It is possible that the Canadian
courts do consider the rights of both parties to share in developed human
capital and take this into account when dividing accumulated assets. The only
time the issue is clearly confronted is where one spouse has directly contributed
to the other spouse's education and the parties separate before any assets are
acquired that might be transferred to satisfy the interest.
158 See Bregman, supra note 157. See also Peterson v. Peterson (1979), 12 R.F.L.
(2d) 319 (Ont. H.C.) where the wife was awarded a lump sum payment in recognition of
her contributions that helped establish the initial momentum which permitted her hus-
band, a neurosurgeon, to later accumulate assets; and Weir v. Weir (1978), 96 D.L.R.
(3d) 725, 6 R.F.L. (2d) 189 (Ont. H.C.) where the wife acquired an interest in her hus-
band's non-family assets by enhancing his professional image and reputation by refrain-
ing from working herself.
159 See, e.g., Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401 at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 at
737; Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786 at 791-94, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 at 134-36 (C.A.
3d Dist. 1969); In Re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446 at 462-65, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 668 at 677-79 (C.A. 1st Dist. 1979); In Re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93
at 104-11, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 at 66-71 (C.A. 3d Dist. 1974); Weitzman, supra note 154, at
1214-16.
160 As the court said in Lopez, id. at 110:
While "market value" and the value for marital dissolution purposes of "profes-
sional goodwill" may be synonymous, in our view such value should be determined
with considerable care and caution, since it is a unique situation in which the con-
tinuing practitioner is judicially forced to buy an intangible asset at a judicially
determined value and compelled to pay a former spouse her share in tangible
assets.
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Human capital can take many forms, including improved health, on-the-
job training, study programmes and higher education.161 Of these benefits,
education, dspecially college education, is recognized to be the investment
most likely to pay measurable economic returns to the holder. This is par-
ticularly true of a professional degree where the value of the education can ac-
tually be ascertained on a group-wide basis if not in each individual case. 162
Unlike many property rights a taxpayer can acquire, higher education may
have many personal consumption attributes. Economists generally consider all
the costs of attaining a degree to be investment and ignore any consumption
element when calculating the return on this type of investment. 163 The
magnitude of the value of such a degree is shown by the fact that even using
this calculation, which increases the cost of the investment to its maximum
possible, the rate of return is estimated to be similar to investment in non-
human capital. 164
Some United States jurisdictions that have been asked to compensate one
spouse for her interest in the human capital of the other, as represented by a
professional degree, have simply asserted that education acquisitions are simply
not property because they exhibit none of the attributes normally associated
with property such as "being susceptible of ownership in common, of transfer
and survival."' 165 Others have conceded that the claim may be for a legitimate
property right but it is property that the court has no jurisdiction to divide
and, even if the court could divide it in theory, in practice it could not do so
given the difficulties in valuing the asset. 166 Those jurisdictions that have
recognized education as a property right in which the non-owning spouse may
have an interest have done so on the basis of an economic theory almost iden-
tical to that used to justify a division of assets acquired during the course of
the relationship. The theory is best illustrated in those cases in which one
spouse supported the other while he or she attained a professional degree and
paid for the tuition of the student spouse. It is a situation where "one spouse
has foregone the immediate enjoyment of earned income to enable the other to
pursue an advanced education on a full-time basis. Typically, this sacrifice is
161 See Schultz, Investment in Human Capital (New York: Free Press, 1971) at
36-37.
162 See Krauskopf, supra note 155, at 382-84; Becker, Human Capital (2d ed. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1975), esp. c. IV, "Rates of Return from College Educa-
tion."
When calculating the value of this future income stream, account must be taken of
the higher risk and uncertainty attached to this type of investment when compared to
more common investments. See Thurow, Investment in Human Capital (Belmont, Cal.:
Wadsworth, 1970) at 22.
163See Schultz, supra note 161, at 35ff for a look at the problems involved in
separating consumption elements from investments.
164Id. at 42.
165In Re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 at 800
(C.A. 4th Dist. 1982).
166 See, e.g., Sullivan, id. at 801-802. The Sullivan case was decided on a rehearing.
On first hearing (Civ. 23634, Cal. App. 4th Dist., Jan. 8, 1982) the court decided that an
education was a property right capable of division, which prompted a number of com-
mentators to discuss the appropriate measurement of the value of the right, as well as
the preferable way to determine the portion of that value to which the spouse seeking
compensation should be entitled. See Note (1982), 9 Comm. Prop. J. 64; Parks, Cost as
the Measure of the Community's Interest in a Spouse's Education (1982), 9 Comm.
Prop. J. 110.
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made with the expectation that the parties will enjoy a higher standard of liv-
ing in the future." 167 If the relationship ends long after one spouse has attained
the education, the other spouse's interest may be satisfied by a division of
available assets. However, if the couple separates shortly afterwards, there
may not be other assets to transfer. The courts realize there is a need to prevent
the supporting spouse from suffering an injustice and the spouse who received
the higher education from receiving a windfall and have ordered the newly
educated spouse to compensate his or her former partner. Given the lack of
present resources, the order will usually specify that the awarded amount is to
be paid on an installment basis. 168 The award is not one of support - indeed,
there may be no need for support because the spouse who helped the other party
attain an education is usually working and most likely suffers no drop in living
standard after separation if he or she were formerly supporting the other
spouse. 169 Thus, many courts have specified they are transferring capital prop-
erty, and not making a support order. 170 On other occasions, however, the
courts have made similar property awards and labelled the payments "ali-
mony". 171 Often support awards have been treated as compensatory in
nature 172 and have been limited to the value of support and tuition paid for by
the supporting spouse. 173 But while many courts reject the idea of human
167 DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W. 2d 755 at 758 (Minn. S.Ct. 1981). Other
courts have used similar language to describe this situation. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of
Horstmann, 263 N.W. 2d 885 at 887 (Iowa S.Ct. 1978) quoting the trial court decision:
Had [the husband who attended law school] been working at a full-time job, it is
likely that their joint income would be higher with an attendant increase in living
standards.... However, all of their assets substantially contributed to making up
deficiencies in income and educational expenses due to the fact that [the husband]
was a full-time student rather than a full-time employee during the marriage....
These sacrifices would be acceptable if [the wife] could reap the future benefits of
these sacrifices in the way of increased income and a satisfying life style as a result
of [the husband's] education and legal training.
See also Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W. 2d 266 at 268 (Kentucky C.A. 1979) where the court
noted the wife had "devoted much of the product of several years of labor to an 'invest-
ment in' future family prosperity."
168 See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Horstmann, supra note 167, at 888; DeLa Rosa,
supra note 167, at 757; Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E. 3d 773 at 774 (Ohio C.A. 1961).
169 See, e.g., DeLa Rosa, supra note 167.
170 For example, the Iowa Supreme Court in In Re Marriage of Horstmann, supra
note 167, awarded the wife $18,000 to be paid in installments in recognition of her in-
terest in her husband's legal education and an additional $1 per year alimony. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court in DeLa Rosa, supra note 167, awarded Mrs. DeLa Rosa $11,400
for her contributions towards her husband's education while pointing out she was not
entitled to alimony.
171 See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 168.
172 For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey uses the concept of "reimburse-
ment alimony" which covers "all financial contributions he or she [the support reci-
pient] made to the spouse's successful professional training. Such reimbursement
alimony should cover all financial contributions towards the former spouse's education,
including household expenses, educational costs, school travel expenses and any other
contributions used by the supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license."
See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A. 2d 527 at 534 (N.J. S.Ct. 1982).
173 See, e.g., DeLa Rosa, supra note 167, where the court used an elaborate for-
mula to arrive at an amount equal to the working spouse's contribution to joint living
expenses, after taking into account the student spouse's contributions; Daniels, supra
note 168, where the working wife was awarded $24,000 to reimburse her for her con-
tribution to household expenses and to repay funds her father had contributed to the
family.
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capital giving rise to divisible property, it is not unusual for the same courts to
suggest that "even though the enhanced earning potential provided by a degree
or license is not 'property' for the purposes of [division] .... it clearly should
be a factor considered by the trial judge in determining a proper amount of
alimony,"' 174 in effect awarding a portion of the income attributable to the
human capital of the payor.
b) Choosing the Appropriate Taxpayer
It is not implausible to suggest that a person can "earn" an interest in the
human capital, as represented by education, of a spouse. The value of the
property can be calculated, as can the interest of the non-owning spouse. 175
What tax consequences should follow if the family law courts hearing marital
separation or divorce cases see their support awards as "property" income
based on an investment in human capital theory? Given our tax system's dif-
ferent treatment of income that has been assigned and income from transfer-
red property, one might suggest that if support is really a return on an invest-
ment in human capital, it falls onto the income from transferred property side
of the line and should be taxed in the hands of the new beneficial owner of the
property that produces the income.
A number of responses to this line of reasoning are possible. The easiest is
simply to point out that support orders do not appear to be based on any such
considerations. Indeed, the factors that the courts do take into account when
making support awards reinforce the conclusion that the payments have no at-
tributes of property income. For example, as mentioned earlier, courts may
take into account factors such as remarriage or a new relationship on the part
of the recipient to lower support payments. 176 Similarly, external conditions
unrelated to the former contributions or division of family responsibilities by
the parties are often used to justify an increase in support.177 A return on
capital clearly would not vary according to factors like these.
174 Mahoney, supra note 172, at 536.
175 The working spouse's share will be less than half most likely - while she did
contribute cash, the student spouse had to contribute substantial amounts of intellec-
tual work to pursue the degree. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452
N.Y.S. 2d 801 (Supp. Ct. Westchester County 1982) where Mrs. O'Brien was awarded
forty per cent of the present value of Dr. O'Brien's medical licence. The decision and
formula used to arrive at that figure, as well as an alternative formula, are discussed in
Shuman, Equitable Distribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two theories Toward Coln-
puting Spousal Contributions (1983), 49 Brooklyn L. Rev. 301. Recent cases and trends
across the United States are discussed in Rush, The Supporting Spouse's Rights in the
Other's ProfessionalDegree Upon Divorce (1983), 35 Univ. Fla. L. Rev. 130.
176 See, e.g., Neal v. Neal (1972), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 254, 8 R.F.L. 194 (B.C.S.C.);
Morrow v. Morrow (1980), 18 R.F.L. (2d) 374 (B.C.S.C.) wvhere an ex-wvife cohabiting
with another man was still held to be entitled to maintenance, though the payments were
reduced from $300 per month to $1 per year. Brower v. Brower (1981), 18 R.F.L. 348 at
356 (Ont. S.C.): "[Payment] shall continue until the petitioner remarries or until she
establishes a relationship with a man whereby she is being supported by him or ought to
be supported by him."
177 One common concern of many courts is to protect the public purse. See, e.g.,
Hall v. Hall (1979), 13 R.F.L. (2d) 77 at 79 (B.C.S.C.): "Maintenance is not only for
the benefit of the wife but also for the benefit of the general public in the sense that it
may relieve the public from supporting a divorced spouse."; Collins v. Collins (1978), 2
R.F.L. (2d) 385 at 392, 10 A.R. 214 at 221 (Alta. S.C.): "The public has an interest in
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One could further argue that the nature of the payments themselves
render them quite distinct from property income. The obligation to pay sup-
port often lasts for an indefinite and unknown period and may increase,
decrease, or cease as circumstances change or contingencies occur. If the in-
come stream is considered to emanate from a property right, it is a property in-
separable from its original holder, incapable of legal transfer.
It is nevertheless possible that courts in this country do use a human
capital type of analysis when determining the nature and quantity of a support
obligation. While the problems just mentioned are undeniable, the present
value of a support obligation can be estimated once contingencies such as
remarriage and death are taken into account, 178 just as the present value of the
human capital asset can be determined. And while it may be difficult to find a
case in which a court has specified that the support amount chosen was based
on a portion of the present value of the expected return on another person's
education, the theory that support payments represent a return on an invest-
ment in human capital may be used by family law courts to determine support
obligations so that in their eyes the awards are a form of property income.
While a property income analysis may prove an invaluable tool for family
law courts seeking an equitable resolution to the conflicting interests of parties
seeking a dissolution of economic ties on the one hand and a-continuing sup-
port obligation on the other, there is no reason to assume that it might also
play a role in the income tax analysis of such payments. Viewing support as a
form of property income may be desirable and even essential to a court called
upon to determine an appropriate support award. However, the payment does
not thereby acquire any of the qualities of property income that explain the tax
treatment of that type of income, particularly the lack of attribution following
a transfer of property. Whether family courts choose to categorize the support
payments as an inherent feature of marital or marital-like relationships, as the
consequence of an implied contractual obligation between persons entering
certain relationships or as a form of property income resulting from a division
of labour between spouses, the character of the payments does not alter from
an income tax perspective.
Income taxation is concerned with income as a means of economic com-
mand. The crucial difference between the person who transfers income-
producing property and the person who pays a portion of income becomes evi-
dent the moment the property of the former taxpayer is transferred. At that
point the former taxpayer has lost control of the property while the latter has
only lost control of the final application of his or her income. He or she retains
assuring that spouses do not become public charges." However, not all courts consider
this to be an important factor. See, e.g., Schartner, supra note 55. But see contra
Coupland, supra note 64. The unique character of the alimony obligation is well il-
lustrated by the Felix v. Felix decision, [1973] 2 O.R. 424, 10 R.F.L. 313 (Ont. H.C.)
where the petitioning husband was ordered to pay maintenance to his wife who was
unable to support herself because of physical and mental problems. The order creating
the obligation specified that it would run for an indefinite period unless the wife became
an involuntary patient in an Ontario mental hospital. If she were confined as a patient
in such a hospital the obligation would cease. However, it would commence again if she
were later discharged from the hospital.
178 See Wolfe, Something New in Gift and Estate Taxes (1947), 25 Taxes 217 for
further details.
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the option of producing income or cutting off the economic power simply by
not working. Useful as the property income analysis may be for other pur-
poses, support payments fail to satisfy the crucial criterion for income tax pur-
poses of successfully transferred property income - the severance by the
transferor of initial economic control over the income. The taxpayer who suc-
cessfully transfers property income for income tax purposes can claim no con-
tinuing economic power either to use the income personally or control its flow
to others. The support payor can make no similar claim for he or she retains
the power to cut off the flow at any time. Calling the payments a return on an
investment in human capital fails to provide a sound basis for transferring tax
liability on amounts paid in satisfaction of a support obligation.
3. Consequences to the Recipient
Support payments, like any net receipts, regardless of the rationale for the
obligation they satisfy, are income as that term is defined in this paper; they
enable the holder to exercise command over goods and services in the public
market and should be included in the tax base of the recipient. 179 Given the
present structure of our income tax system there are two reasons why it might
be preferable to exclude such amounts from taxable income. The first is to
achieve a measure of horizontal equity with other taxpayers who receive equal
amounts that are not now taxed because of the exclusion of gifts from taxable
income. Such an argument would not be persuasive, however, in light of the
inconsistent treatment presently accorded various types of income.
The second argument in favour of not taxing support payments is the
need to ensure the income tax system is neutral with regard to personal or
family living arrangements once we have chosen to treat individuals as
separate taxable units. In an ideal income tax system support payments would
be taxed in the hands of the recipient and the tax-free receipt of such amounts
admittedly would be a deviation from our goal of a comprehensive tax base.
However, to include support payments in the taxable income of the recipient,
without at the same time addressing the anomolous treatment of support
within a household, would result in the abandonment of the goal of neutrality
that would be achieved by not permitting the payor a deduction for alimony
payments.
a) Horizontal Equity
Were marriages or marriage-like relationships built upon express or im-
plied contract, support payments might be viewed as a form of pension for
past household services performed or promised. There is little doubt that
179The Gould case, supra note 67, which established the tax treatment of support
payments for the first twenty-five years of income taxation in Canada, had decided the
amounts received as support were not "income". However, as explained earlier, that
conclusion was most likely based on the fact that the amounts had already been taxed in
the payor's hands (see text accompanying note 70, supra). Thirty-three years later, the
Court of Claims was faced with an argument that alimony was not income, based on the
Gould decision, in Mahana, supra note 70. It noted:
[The taxpayer (recipient)] says [an alimony receipt] is not income; therefore the Six-
teenth Amendment does not authorize its taxation. The argument is, at first, sur-
prising. A large sum of money comes into the plaintiff's hands.... It is income to
spend, to live on, to save. Is it not also income to tax, if Congress sees fit, as it has,
to tax it? ... In everyday usage the plaintiff, receiving large sums of money cur-
rently from a man who ceased to be her husband more than twenty years ago,
would be regarded as having an income.
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similar amounts paid to a former housekeeper or babysitter would be taxable
in the hands of the recipient and it might be suggested that an ex-spouse or
partner receiving support payments offered similar consideration in return for
a right to support. Marriages and family relationships are not formed by con-
tract, however, and one could view support payments as a form of income
from services only by ignoring the innumerable intangible, emotive aspects of
those relationships that give rise to support obligations.
But if support payments are not paid pursuant to an express or implied
contract, neither are they purely gratuitous receipts like gifts. If they were not
court ordered or made in satisfaction of an obligation that could be legally en-
forced in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the incidence of in-
come transfers between often antagonistic and usually adverse parties would
be slight.
Nevertheless, in many respects support payments are analogous to
gifts. is0 The most important similarity between the two types of transfers is the
fact that in both cases the amounts are used only once, by the recipient, for ac-
tual physical consumption. Gifts are income for both the transferor and reci-
pient and ideally should enter the tax base of both parties despite the fact they
are only "used" once.181 Gifts are not considered taxable income in Canada,
however, and the exclusion gives rise to a problem of horizontal equity. 182 One
180 As Bittker correctly points out, "Support is a next door neighbour of gifts and
bequests; if wives and children are not taxed on the support they receive from [husbands/
fathers] in their taxable income, some mighty fine distinctions will have to be drawn."
Bittker, supra note 26, at 947.
181 "To prescribe that gifts must be made from the tax-paid income of the donor
and that they are income to the donee does not in our opinion involve 'double taxation'.
We simply recommend that all income be taxed once to each unit that received it."
Supra note 111, at 466.
Simons emphasized the grounds for including gratuitous receipts in income. See
Simons, supra note 12, at 56-58, 125-47, 211-12. Professor Andrews claims that Simons
later retreated from his assertion that such amounts should be included in the income
tax base (Andrews, supra note 7, at 320, n. 25 and 352, n. 73). The reference cited by
Professor Andrews in support of his claim is a plea by Simons for the imposition of a
more sensible gift tax on donees. Simon's essay, however, did not suggest the gift tax
was the ideal way to tax such amounts. Rather, it was a suggestion for a practical way to
include gifts in a tax base so that progressive rates could be applied on the basis of the
donee's ability to pay rather than the donor's, given the fact that donors paid gift taxes
and not donees. Subsequent to his original proposals, Simons admitted that administra-
tive and practical concerns might require some modification of the suggestions and that
preferable approaches for dealing with gratuitous receipts might be possible, although
he was not aware of any. His suggestion that they be dealt with by a progressive estate
and gift tax was offered as an interim proposal for federal tax reform on the basis of its
relative simplicity, which made it a proper candidate to stand "first in an agenda for
discussion or for action." See Simons, Federal Tax Reform (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1950) at 138-39.
182 Unlike the British income tax law in effect at the time of Canada's first federal
income tax act, the Canadian act did not attempt to identify and tax separately income
from various sources. Instead tax was levied on "income" generally. The exclusion of
gifts from an otherwise apparently broad tax base was no doubt due to the fact that the
American precedents on which the Canadian definition section was modeled also ex-
cluded gifts. Interestingly, the American Income Tax Act of 1894 did include gifts in in-
come. That act was found to be unconstitutional and the 1913 Act, passed subsequent
to a constitutional amendment, did not include gratuitous rceipts in the income tax
base. While the American law continues to specify that gifts are non-taxable (see §102
of the Internal Revenue Code), there is no longer a specific exclusion of gifts in the
Canadian Act, although the influence of practice and precedent guarantees that such
amounts will continue to be exempt from taxation.
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person will be taxed on earned income and income from capital while a second
person with the same net income who neither owns capital nor worked for the
payment will claim it is a gift and pay no'tax on the amount. In a number of
ways it seems logical to treat support recipients similarly to those persons
whose income is received in the form of gifts. In both cases the transferred
amount is only used once for actual physical consumption of goods or ser-
vices. In both cases the transferor exchanged services or the use of capital in
return for the initial receipt, although it may be difficult to discern any direct
services provided by the ultimate recipient to the transferor in return for the
payment. 183
These considerations might be offset, however, by the fact that in many
other ways support payments are dissimilar from gifts and resemble more
closely receipts that are presently taxable. Unlike most gifts, support payments
are made at regular intervals by a payor who has little option whether or not to
transfer the amounts. Any attempt to arrive at the appropriate treatment by
analogy to other taxable or tax-free receipts is clearly impossible given the in-
consistent treatment of these other amounts. Achieving horizontal equity with
either taxable or non-taxable income will produce an inequity with the one not
chosen as the appropriate model for support payments. A principled solution
is not possible in an income tax system that draws a dividing line between tax-
able and tax-free income without a rational basis for the distinction.
b) Neutrality
If the present inconsistencies in our income tax base preclude a solution to
the support payment question that will satisfy the concerns of horizontal equity,
the treatment chosen should at least seek to achieve the goals of an income tax
system that can be attained. Given our choice of an individual tax unit and a
tax system that in most respects, though not entirely, treats married and un-
married taxpayers similarly, the tax treatment of support payments should
maintain the tax system's neutrality vis-&A-vis family relations. In other words,
support payments should receive like treatment whether made within a
household composed of separate tax units or outside an ongoing family. In-
come transfers within one tax unit should give rise to no tax consequences and
the exclusion of support payments from taxable income is a logical conse-
quence of the adoption of the family as the taxable unit. 18 But in a system that
taxes individuals, the transferred income should be taxable in the hands of the
recipient regardless of his or her family or household living arrangements. If
income transfers are not taxed in the hands of the recipient where he or she
lives with the donor in a family-like relationship, a violation of a pure com-
prehensive tax based ideal, tax liabilities should not change dramatically when
similar payments are made following the dissolution of the relationship.
183 On the other hand, in the case of spouses it may be easy to identify the services
which appear to be provided to the supporting spouse by the spouse who stays at home.
A new difficulty arises in this case, however, namely separating the exchanged services
from self-performed household services presently exempt from taxation.
184 "Under [the family unit] concept, transfers of wealth within a family unit would
not be subjet to tax, just as a transfer of cash from one pocket to another is outside the
scope of the present system. Only transfers of wealth between tax units would have tax
consequences." Supra note 11, at 467.
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To arrive at a principled treatment of support payments received by a
separated spouse, we have to begin with the appropriate treatment of such
transfers in an ongoing family. The easiest case for non-taxation of support is
found in the two-earner household. In such a case it is no doubt true that there
will be an intermingling of assets and purchases as well as consumption of the
fruits of each other's labours. One feels comfortable ignoring the transfers
back and forth for tax purposes, however, because the transfers most likely
offset one another and the extent to which they do not can be treated as de
minimus. A more difficult case is that of a one-earner household. If the earner
hired a housekeeper to cook, clean and care for her children, we would have
no hesitation in taxing the housekeeper on the payments he or she received in
return for such services. What happens when the taxpayer marries the
housekeeper who continues to perform the same services and receives what is
now considered support (either in cash or in-kind as rent, food and vacations)?
Under an individual tax unit system the earner should be taxed on the income
as it is originally earned and once it is transferred in cash or kind to the
earner's spouse it should be taxed again in the hands of the spouse who is a
separate tax unit and who actually consumes with it. Such support would be
virtually impossible to quantify in most cases. Many of the services performed
by the non-working spouse remaining in the home might be viewed as self-
performed services. To avoid problems of administrative complexity and dif-
ficulty of valuation we make no attempt to tax persons on the value of self-
performed services when they are single; there is no reason why a married or
cohabiting person should be treated differently. It would be impossible to
separate the portion of the services performed by the non-working spouse that
was for his or her benefit from that which was for the benefit of the spouse
earning an outside income. For these reasons, no attempt is made to tax the
non-working spouse on the value of support enjoyed by him or her.
It thus becomes much more problematic to consider taxing the recipient of
support who is not living in the same household as the provider when the reci-
pient living with the supporter is exempt from such tax if neutrality requires
both to be treated similarly. There are three possible responses to the problem.
First, we might seek some way to tax the non-working spouse living with the
provider on the value of support he or she receives. Second, we might
acknowledge the difficulties that would be encountered in taxing persons in
these particular circumstances but resolve to tax according to our principles
where the problems that prevented taxing the recipient spouse in the payor's
household do not exist. Finally, we might concede that impossibility of taxing
the recipient spouse living with the supporter and treat the recipient living in a
separate household similarly. If it were practical, the first solution would be
preferable. Adopting either of the other solutions would mean choosing be-
tween competing priorities.
The problems that would be encountered in taxing a non-working spouse
living with a person supporting him or her have already been outlined. While
taxing the support recipient directly is not feasible, it might be possible to
achieve the same ends through the use of a surrogate. We could, for example,
tax the transferor more heavily than would be the case if he or she were single
and paying the person providing him or her with housekeeping or childrearing
services so that the latter person would also be paying taxes on the transferred
payments. The effect would be the equivalent of a withholding tax that would
act as a proxy for actual taxation of the non-earning spouse. To some extent
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the Canadian income tax system does this. For example, an individual with a
child can deduct up to $4,000 from his or her income if the amount was paid
on account of child care expenses. 185 If such services are performed by the tax-
payer's spouse no deduction is allowed. Since the deduction saves a taxpayer a
tax liability at his or her marginal rates, the extra tax paid by the taxpayer, who
is unable to utilize the deduction because his or her spouse cares for the
children, might be viewed as a proxy tax on the income of the spouse perform-
ing those services. 186
In the long run one would have to admit that the few provisions that
might be seen as acting as surrogate taxes on the support in cash or kind receiv-
ed by a supported spouse cohabiting with his or her partner are grossly inade-
quate for accomplishing the end attributed to them and for which they were
never designed. Furthermore, they are likely to be more than offset by other
provisions extending tax preferences to married persons. 187
If our priority was to achieve a comprehensive tax base wherever possible,
we might regret our inability to tax the non-working cohabiting spouse but
resolve to tax support where it is technically feasible, that is, where the spouses
are living apart. However, broadening the tax base is only fair where all tax-
payers in receipt of the type of income that is to be included in the broader
base are treated similarly. Just as it would not be acceptable to tax capital
gains at full rates for separated persons and at preferential rates for those who
are cohabiting, to include support in the recipient's taxable income only where
the recipient lives separately from the payor would result in a great inequity
and a flagrant violation of the tax system's neutrality towards family living
situations. Broadening the tax base should only be attempted where it will be
applied consistently. Ideally, support payments should be taxed in the hands
of all recipients living with or separate from the supporters. In the absence of
such a tax on intra-family transfers, none should be imposed on amounts paid
pursuant to a support obligation that persists after the dissolution of the
family. 188
185 Section 63 of the Act.
186 An alternative approach might be to argue that the ideal tax base would ignore
child care expenses and the deduction is not intended to create a proxy tax for those
unable to utilize it, but rather is designed to equalize the treatment of those who work to
pay for child care services and those who provide their own child services and thereby
realize imputed income that is not taxed.
187For example, married persons are able to transfer a number of unused deduc-
tions such as the investment income deduction, full-time student deduction, over 65
years old deduction, blind or confined to a bed or wheelchair deduction and pension in-
come deduction (s. 110.3). In addition, spouses may split income by making contribu-
tions to a non-working spouse's RRSP (s. 146 (5.1)) and the deemed disposition rules
can be avoided for property transfers at death to spouses (s. 70(6) ).
188 Randolph Paul, the Treasury tax advisor who in 1942 introduced to Congress
the Treasury proposals for altering the taxation of support, had written earlier that it
made sense to tax support received by a separated spouse even if that received by a per-
son cohabiting with the payor was not taxed because in the former case the recipient "is
free to spend for any purpose she desires" and thus should not enjoy the same immunity
from tax offered the latter recipient. Once again, this analysis is not consistent with a
tax system that adopts the individual as a separate tax unit. See Paul, Studies in Federal
Taxation (3d series Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1940) at 245, n. 310.
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D. Tax Expenditure Analysis of the Present Support Payments Provisions
1. Purposes of a Support Payments Tax Expenditure
If support represents a consumption outlay of the payor that would not be
deductible in a normative tax system, the transfer of tax liability on the
payments is a tax expenditure. 189 Unlike a deduction such as that for charitable
donations, the transferred amount does not escape the tax system; it is taxed in
the recipient's hands instead of the payor's. The difference in marginal rates
between the two parties is the measure of the government subsidy for that par-
ticular transfer.
To justify this deviation from a normative tax system two requirements
should be satisfied. First, it must be shown that there is a need for government
intervention to help finance this income transfer arrangement. Second, it
should be demonstrated that the income tax system is an appropriate
mechanism for achieving those objectives. The effect of the tax transfer provi-
sions is to make available extra funds for families maintaining two
households. The purpose of the provisions was clearly not to encourage
divorce or separation. 190 One could, however, hypothesize a number of
beneficial social and economic effects resulting from the extra income made
189 Curiously enough, the Canadian government's tax expenditure account suggests
that the transfer of support payments for tax purposes gives rise to a tax expenditure only
where support payments are made pursuant to a written agreement, and not where they
arise from a court order. Support agreements are simply out-of-court settlements that
recognize the same support obligation that is incorporated into judicial decrees in other
cases where the parties are unwilling or unable to agree on the extent of the obligation.
The nature of the payments and their tax treatment should not vary whether they are
made pursuant to a court order or to an enforceable contract that recognizes the sup-
port obligation a court would impose were the matter litigated. See Can., Dept. of
Finance, Government of Canada Tax Expenditure Account (Ottawa, 1979) at 79. Pro-
fessor Neil Brooks includes the entire deduction in his tax expenditure account. He
claims "most people" would agree with his categorization. See Brooks, The TaxExpen-
diture Concept (1979), 1 Can. Tax. 31 at 34.
190 While taxpayers will often go to great lengths to lower their tax burden, in-
cluding divorce in some cases (see, e.g., Boyter v. C.I.R. Service, 74 T.C. 989 (1980),
aff'd and remanded 668 F. 2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981) ), the requirements in the transfer
provisions for support payments make the income-splitting available only to those
whose relationship has ended (that is, who are living apart). It is highly improbable that
the tax benefits would cause a relationship to end. It has nevertheless been asserted that
the provisions act as tax subsidies for divorce or separation. See, e.g., Baird, Canada's
Human Scrapheap (1957), 5 Can. Tax J. 106 at 108-109. The American provisions have
been similarly described in Johnson, The Alimony Tax Sections Need Overhauling(1950), 28 Taxes 917 at 921: "The government sharing of costs in underwriting, for ex-
ample, a grower of grain or fruits or potatoes is a subsidy, and there is no less than a
subsidy for divorce with large support consequences and to the prejudice of marriage in
the current tax treatment." Johnson argued, at 928, that the discrimination against
married persons created by the alimony deduction could have been eliminated by per-
mitting married persons a support deduction. As applied to the American tax law, his
article was two years out of date since split incomes, introduced in 1948, eliminated the
advantage enjoyed by divorced persons prior to that time.
The Australian government considered adopting provisions similar to the American
changes in 1942 and rejected the idea because it felt "that a taxpayer who was separated
or divorced from his wife would have been placed in a more advantageous position than
a taxpayer who was not." Aust., Taxation Review Committee, Full Report (Asprey
Report) (Canberra: Aust. Government Publishing Service, 1974) at 138.
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available in these cases. 91 The lower tax burden, for example, might lower the
rate of default by those making support payments. 192 It might make it more
feasible for support payors to remarry or undertake new family respon-
sibilities. 193 Finally, it might be designed to recognize the decreased ability of
the total income to bear the tax burden as a result of the increased costs of
maintaining two households on an income that formerly supported one. 194 A
normative tax system does not recognize every decrease in ability to pay as the
result of income transfers not involving actual consumption of goods or ser-
vices by the transferor. It was conceded, however, that support payments pre-
sent a difficult case close to the margin. Unlike most income assignments, they
involve the payor forfeiting economic 'control over a portion of his or her in-
come for an indefinite period to a person no longer within the family. The case
for government intervention in this situation has yet to be established.
However, if the state is furthering legitimate social goals by subsidizing these
transfer payments, it seems appropriate that the subsidy should be designed to
have its maximum impact in those cases where aid is needed most. 195
2. Choosing the Payments Eligible for the Tax Expenditure
The present support payments provisions are quite narrow in their ap-
plication. The legislature has singled out only a small sub-set of the potential
transfers between spouses or ex-spouses as qualifying for the provision. Two
191 One reason that must be rejected is that which motivated the original transfer
provisions: "The husband's compelling need for tax relief obscures the fundamental
issue of who ought to be taxable on the portion of the husband's income which the wife
consumes." Steines, A Reappraisal of the Taxation of Wealth Transfers Incident to
Divorce (1981), 56 Wash. L. Rev. 217 at 246, n. 128. In 1942 it was quite possible that
some taxpayers making fixed alimony payments out of their after-tax income found that
rising tax rates had left them with little or no income at all for their personal use. It
would not be possible for taxes and alimony to exceed the total income of the taxpayer
if the alimony obligation were negotiated in light of the tax changes. This could only oc-
cur if the payments were based on an after-tax income that changed subsequent to the
fixing of the obligation as tax rates changed. Temporary relief might be necessary under
those circumstances, but in an era of relative stability in tax rates, the provisions are no
longer needed to help those who had calculated their obligations on the assumption of a
particular tax burden only to find that their tax liability had unexpectedly increased.
192 "The availability of a tax deduction may encourage payment of support obliga-
tions as the cost factor of an individual paying a deductible expense is decreased relative
to other forms of debt." Dawe, Section 60(b) of the Income Tax Act: An Analysis and
Some Proposals for Reform (1979), 5 Queen's L. J. 153 at 162. Baird, supra note 190,
claimed it was impossible for some taxpayers to afford support payments without a
deduction. See also Bence in Debates, July 17, 1942, at 4360.193 McGregor, Alimony and Maintenance Payments (1969), 17 Can. Tax J. 453 at
457.
194 Or, as one commentator described it, a "sharing" of support costs by the
government. Rich, Recent Cases and Trends Involving theAlimony Deduction (1948), 6
N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax. 1088 at 1090.195 It may be possible to design a programme involving government intervention to
further these ends without resorting to the traditional solution of periodic support
payments. For example, a study paper produced for the Law Reform Commission of
Canada suggested that the government could establish a system of government-insured
loans for lump sum settlements of support obligations to solve the existing problems of
inability to pay and enforce support orders and agreements. See Ryan, Enforcement of
Maintenance Obligations (Ottawa: Information Canada for Law Reform Commission
of Canada, 1976) at 42-43.
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restrictions imposed on payments eligible for the deduction and consequent in-
clusion in the recipient's income are especially important: first, the payment
must appear to be of a compulsory nature, equally binding on both parties and
second, the use of the transferred income must be entirely within the discretion
of the recipient. But while both restrictions might serve to delineate the type of
transfers appropriate for government attention and aid, they do not alter the
basic nature of the payments nor change the fact that the government interven-
tion is essentially a subsidy programme.
a) Compulsory Nature of the Payments
In its original form the Canadian provision permitting a deduction of sup-
port payments appeared more liberal than the United States provision on
which it was modeled. The Canadian provision permitted a deduction for
payments made pursuant to a court order or a separation agreement. 196 In the
United States, Congressional leaders feared that allowing a deduction for
payments that were not ordered by a court would open the door to income
splitting through the use of contracts that were not bona fide separation
agreements. Accordingly, they drafted their provision so that only payments
satistying an obligation imposed by a court could be deducted. 197 After the
1948 changes to the Internal Revenue Code that permitted spouses living
together to split income, the fear that agreements would be used as tax
avoidance devices vanished and the provision was altered in the 1954 Code to
also permit deductions for payments made pursuant to agreements between
the parties. 198
The courts have interpreted the Canadian provisions rather narrowly. The
only agreements that are recognized for the purposes of the deduction provi-
sion are those that have been accepted by both parties and can be construed as
a settlement in lieu of a court determination. Thus, tax courts have held that
agreements must be acknowledged by both sides and payments made pursuant
to an unacknowledged letter' 99 or to correspondence between the parties'
lawyers acting as their agents2°° have been held to be outside the scope of the
deduction provision.
b) Allowance Nature of the Payments
In a different respect the Canadian deduction provision was, and remains,
much stricter in application than its American counterpart. To qualify for a
deduction, the payment must be made in the form of an allowance, which has
been defined as an amount determined in advance which, once paid, "is at the
196 The provision was later amended to include "written agreements" and not just
"separation agreements" so that marriage contracts and similar arrangements would be
given the same effect. Supra note 109.
197 G.C.M. 25250, 1947-2 C.B. 32 (1947) suggested, "Such limitations on alimony
deductions was [sic] probably due to the apprehension that unless the payments were
part of or incident to some publicly recorded action of a court, separation agreements
might be used for tax avoidance."
198 See Hewitt, Note (1949), 47 Mich. L. Rev. 726; Larsen, Note (1949), 37 Cal. L.
Rev. 519 at 521; Bayly, Alimony Income and Deduction (1954), 32 Taxes 71 at 73;
Lagormarcino, supra note 70.
199 Gagne v. M.N.R., [1976] C.T.C. 2163.
2wKostinerv. M.N.R. (1963), 32 Tax A.B.C. 124.
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complete disposition of the recipient who is not required to account for it." 201
Relying on the allowance requirement, the Canadian courts declined to follow
American precedent which permitted taxpayers to deduct amounts paid to
third parties with the agreement of the other spouse. American courts treated
these payments as income assignments by the recipient spouse, that is, they
were treated as though the income was constructively received in the recipient's
hands. 20 2 A provision was added to the Canadian Act in 1974 to specifically
authorize taxpayers to deduct payments made to third parties. 20 3 However,
Revenue Canada has adopted the position that the new section does not
enlarge the scope of the deduction provision but merely deems the beneficiary
spouse to have received amounts paid to third parties. Thus, the Minister has
insisted that to qualify for the deduction payments must continue to be in the
form of an allowance, meaning that the recipient can "at any time change [the]
arrangement and require the [payments be made] directly to her to do with as
she wishes.' 204 Taxpayers argued that the new provision authorizing payments
to third parties did not act only as a deeming provision but in fact enlarged the
scope of the deduction to cover payments that fail to meet the "allowance"
definition utilized by the Department of Revenue. Following a number of deci-
sions in taxpayers' favour on this point, 20 5 the section was amended in 1981206
through the addition of a qualifying phrase designed to limit its operation by
stipulating that the new provision applied to payments that would otherwise
qualify for the deduction were they made directly to the recipient, which
presumably imposes the allowance requirement on these payments. It appears
that the courts will continue to apply this restriction to allowable deduc-
tions. 207
Support payments made within a family can be deducted from a
taxpayer's income, to a maximum of $1,400. Certain support payments to
spouses or ex-spouses living apart from the payor are presently entitled to a
much more generous tax treatment if they meet the requirements set out above
as to the compulsory nature of the payment and the lack of control over the
use of the money by the payor. It is important to realize that, although these
restrictions are useful in determining the type of payments entitled to special
treatment, they do not in themselves change the character of the payments.
201 The Queen v. Pascoe, [1975] C.T.C. 656 at 658 (F.C.A.).
202 See Note (1966), 66 Col. L. Rev. 1118 at 1120.
203 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 26, s. 31.
204 IT-1118R, par. 15.
205 The leading decision on the point to work its way through the courts is The
Queen v. Bryce, [1978] C.T.C. 3144, 78 D.T.C. 1833. The Tax Review Board allowed
the taxpayer to deduct one half of mortgage, property tax and utility payments made
directly to appropriate parties when they arose from a jointly owned matrimonial home
and the payments were authorized by the decree nisi. That holding was followed in a
number of subsequent Tax Review Board decisions.
206 S.C. 1980-81, c. 48, s. 30.
207 The Federal Court - Trial Division affirmed the Bryce decision, supra note 205([1980] C.T.C. 401). The Federal Court of Appeal, hearing the case subsequent to the
amendment, reversed the court below and held that the payments must meet the
allowance requirement to be deductible, and that the amounts in question were not of
an allowance nature ([1982] C.T.C. 132). The taxpayer is appealing that decision to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
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A number of American writers have suggested the effect of the provi-
sions, which permit taxpayers to deduct amounts paid as alimony from income
and which subsequently include the same amounts in the recipients' taxable in-
come, is to treat the transferred part of the payor's income as though it were
earned directly by the recipient, so that the person who is given ultimate con-
trol over the use of the income is considered the owner of that money for tax
purposes, while the payor acts as a mere conduit. 20 8 Under this analysis, the
deduction is not a tax expenditure but rather a tool for determining the ap-
propriate taxpayer. The conduit interpretation can only be valid, if at all,
when the transferred income is paid from one taxpayer to another in the same
tax unit, 209 a point not realized by some commentators. For example, Pro-
fessor Boris Bittker strongly criticized American advocates of a comprehensive
tax base for their failure to classify the alimony deduction and consequent in-
clusion in the recipient's income as a deviation from a normative tax base, in
light of the fact that other support payments within an existing family were not
treated similarly. 210 Professor Bittker was wrong. At the time he wrote, the
United States tax system did permit married taxpayers to deduct support via
the income splitting schedule for married persons. Since 1969, the ability to
split income has been decreased slightly, but it still exists. 211 It could be argued
that the alimony deduction is not a deviation from the normative tax base at
all, once a marital tax unit is chosen - support payments before and after
family dissolution are treated in a similar fashion. After family dissolution
there are two separate tax units for most purposes; for the purpose of support
payments flowing from the marital obligation, however, there remains one in
the United States income tax system.
In a system that treats each person, whether married or not, as a separate
tax unit, the lack of control by the payor over support payments subsequent to
the transfer is not sufficient to reduce his or her status to that of a conduit. At
the same time, if a deviation is to be made from some purpose extraneous to
the tax system, these characteristics of transfers made pursuant to compulsion
that afford the transferor no further control over the disposition of the funds
are appropriate for flagging the payments eligible to receive preferential treat-
ment. Any proposals for reform of this tax expenditure can begin with similar
restrictions on the type of payments eligible for the programme.
201 Vickrey makes an analogy to trust payments, supra note 128, at 302. See also
Magill, Taxable Income (rev. ed. New York: Ronald Press, 1945) at 275 where he sug-
gests the tax treatment of support payments brings "the concept of income in the
alimony field back into accord with a fundamental principle that 'the legal concept of
ownership of income and the economic realities of enjoyment or fruition' should corres-
pond." See also Davies, The Taxation of Alimony: Policies, Problems and a Proposal(1977), 31 Univ. Miami L. Rev. 1355 at 1406: "The legislature's reason seems to be
premised on the belief that a portion of the husband's income is really the wife's in-
come .... The question [is] whether the wife could stand in the husband's shoes and
thus derive 'income' from the same sources as the husband could have done."209 If income passes from one tax unit to a separate tax unit,'it affords both units
economic command. Failure to exercise the potential command by the first unit does
not alter its character as a taxable quality.210 Bittker, supra note 26, at 946-47, 974-76.
211 Bittker continued his criticism following the changes. See Bittker, Income Tax
Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures (1973), 16 J. Law &
Econ. 193 at 202, 210-11.
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3. The Income Tax System as a Vehicle for Distributing the Subsidy
The income tax system would appear to be an ideal vehicle for distributing
government aid to persons making and receiving support payments if the pro-
visions were structured to ensure that the benefits could be targeted to those
who need them. Because the benefits act as income supplements in those situa-
tions where two households are living off the income of one earner, it seems
logical that benefit levels could be determined at the same time the total in-
come available to the parties and its relative distribution is calculated. Before a
tax provision to distribute the benefits can be endorsed, however, it should
first be demonstrated that the benefits are being appropriately distributed be-
tween the parties in any one case and, second, that they are equitably
distributed between taxpayers in different income brackets and between tax-
payers transferring different percentages of the total available income.
Papers on the income tax consequences of divorce and separation are
routinely presented at family law conferences 212 and appear in family law jour-
nals, 213 texts, 2 14 case reports215 and looseleaf reporter services. 216 It is not
unreasonable to assume that most family law lawyers have an understanding
of the fundamental tax consequences of family dissolution. If judicial action is
commenced before a settlement is reached, the parties can obtain particulars
of the property, income and expenses of the other party, as well as a copy of
their income tax return for the previous year. It would be irresponsible for any
lawyer to ignore the tax effects of a proposed settlement. 2 17 However, no
studies have determined the extent to which the extra after-tax income
available for splitting between the spouses once they have ceased to cohabit
benefits the payor or recipient. Most commentators claim the extra benefit is
distributed during the settlement negotiations, 218 although some believe it
often flows only to the payor. 2 9 In addition to the information on the tax con-
sequences of divorce and separation generally available to family law practi-
tioners, papers on the subject are presented at judicial conferences on family
212 See, e.g., Suzuki, "Income Tax Consequences of Separation and Divorce," in
Can. Bar Assoc. (Ont.), Financial Support and its Tax Implications (Second Annual In-
stitute on Continuing Legal Education) (Toronto, 1977); Suzuki, "Income Tax Conse-
quences of Separation and Divorce," in Man. Bar Assoc., Family Law and Practice(Isaac Pitblado Lectures on Continuing Legal Education) (Winnipeg: Man. Bar Assoc.,
1979) at 49.
213 See, e.g., Suzuki, Income Tax Consequences of Separation and Divorce (1979),
2 Can. J. Fam. Law 33.
214See, e.g., McNair, "Tax Implications of Cohabitation," in Holland, ed., Un-
married Couples: LegalAspects of Cohabitation (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 187.
215 See, e.g., Fong, Tax Implications of Support Payments (1972), 5 R.F.L. 253.
216 See, e.g., McNair, "Tax Implications of Family Property Law," in Bissett-
Johnson and Holland, eds., Matrimonial Property Law in Canada (Toronto: Bur-
roughs & Co., 1980 (and supplements) ).
217 See Norton, Tax Traps in Alimony Payments (1950), 4 Ark. L. Rev. 325; Bayly,
supra note 198; Sheppard, Taxation of the Family Divided: Divorce - Canadian Style(1975), 23 Chitty's L. J. 293 at 294.
218 See, e.g., London, Tax and the Family (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of
Canada, 1975) at 293; Dulude, Background Study on Women and the Personal Income
Tax System (Ottawa: Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1976) at 20.
219 See, e.g., Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Statement on the Tax
Deductibility ofAlimony/Maintenance Payments (June 22, 1977) at 1.
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law220 and it appears that judges hearing family law cases are aware of the tax
consequences flowing from their awards. 221 Of course counsel for the parties
have an interest in noting the consequences favourable to their case during
argument. In addition to these sources, judges have access to charts detailing
the after-tax consequences of support payments. 222 If the benefits are not
distributed in an appropriate manner between the parties involved in the in-
come transfer, it is not because of inadequately available information. There is
no evidence that in this regard the tax system is inferior to any other vehicle for
distributing these subsidies.
4. Achieving Horizontal and Vertical Equity with the Tax Expenditures
It is difficult to achieve horizontal and vertical equity when distributing
benefits through the tax system. Nevertheless, in the case of subsidies for sup-
port payments, it is arguably even more difficult to reach these ends outside of
that system. The difficulty stems from the conflicting aims of and rationale for
the benefits. Viewed purely as a subsidy, it is clear that taxpayers in lower
brackets are more deserving than those with significantly higher incomes. But
if one of the purposes for the benefit is to recognize the decreased ability to
m See, e.g., Shultz, "An Overview of the Income Tax Implications of Matrimonial
Dissolution," in Abella and Dube, eds., Family Law: Dimensions in Justice (Butter-
worth, 1983).
221 See, e.g., Wittke v. Wittke (1974), 16 R.F.L. 349 at 363 (Sask. Q.B.):
The Income Tax Act, [citations omitted], allows [the husband] in computing his in-
come tax to deduct all maintenance payments. . . .On the other hand, such
periodic payments [for the wife and children] must be included by the [wife] in
computing her income, and to the extent that such exceeds the statutory exemp-
tions such become taxable income in her hands.... [The court then calculated the
respective tax liabilities flowing from the proposed support order]. . . .When
Parliament direct the Court by said s. 11 [of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.D-8]
to provide reasonable maintenance for spouses and infants, Parliament was aware
of the provisions of the then existing Income Tax Act.... It seems to me to logically
follow that the incidence of tax is it affects both the payer and recipient of
maintenance payments made under court orders is a matter to be considered along
with other relevant matters when determining the amount necessary to be paid to
make sure that the dependent will receive what is reasonable maintenance in all the
circumstances of the case for such dependant.
See also Sharpe v. Sharpe (1971), 4 R.F.L. 241 (Nfld. S.C.) where the court considered
the tax advantage of paying maintenance when assessing quantum; Sheppard, supra
note 217, at 294: "In deciding the amount of alimony or maintenance where the matter
is in issue, courts will bear in mind the tax consequences to the parties." Sheppard pro-
vides a number of examples at 307, n. 10.
The matrimonial property laws of Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Saskat-
chewan specify that the tax consequences of any property division must be taken into
account when making a distribution of property. See, e.g., Millhaem v. Millhaem
(1981), 16 A.L.R. (2d) 355, 24 R.F.L. (2d) 44 (Alta. Q.B.). The significance of tax con-
sequences are similarly considered in provinces without specific statutory direction. For
example, in Silverstein, supra note 157, at 204, counsel for the wife suggested that she
would trade the interest in rental properties that the court had awarded her in exchange
for her husband's interest in the family home. Galligan J. refused the request saying it
would not be "equitable to deprive one spouse of his share in one of the few assets
which do not attract capital gains tax, the matrimonial home." The tax implications
were central to his award and he noted, "If a spouse is to share in a non-family asset
[interest in rental property awarded the wife] ... such spouse should also share the
burdens that go with the asset [capital cost recapture]."222 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 161, appendix.
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pay of the taxpayer who has lost economic control over the part of his or her
income transferred as support, the taxpayer in the highest marginal bracket
still merits a subsidy when compared to another taxpayer in the same bracket
without a support obligation. At the same time, the relief should only be a par-
tial compensation for the transfer, given the consumption nature of the expen-
diture. The difficulties in achieving these aims through tax provisions can be
demonstrated by first examining the effects of distributing benefits via the tax
system through a number of alternate techniques. This exercise will establish
the parameters of a preferable provision.
An unlimited deduction for the transferor is not suitable for two reasons.
It is true that this approach does achieve a measure of horizontal equity by
treating the taxpayer who has lost economic control over amounts paid as sup-
port preferentially to taxpayers at the same income level without that obliga-
tion. The relief offered will overcompensate the support payor relative to those
who have lost economic control over income for other reasons, however,
because the support obligation is a consumption expense of the payor from an
income theory perspective and total tax relief on the transfer is therefore inap-
propriate. Furthermore, the deduction for support payments will fail to
achieve vertical equity when the subsidy nature of the provision is considered.
It makes little sense for the support payor with a $100,000 income who
transfers four percent of his or her income or $4,000 to a spouse to receive a
larger subsidy than the taxpayer with $10,000 who transfers fifty percent or
$5,000. And yet the upside-down effect of subsidies offered through the
deduction from taxable income mechanism would accomplish just that.
A provision permitting a full deduction of transfer payments up to a fixed
percentage of total income limit is now used in the United States and Canada
for charitable donations. While such a provision would prevent the highest
bracket taxpayers from receiving too great a subsidy, it achieves neither
horizontal nor vertical equity. The upside-down effect is compounded by the
fact that the taxpayer in the lower brackets faces the same percentage limit as
those in the highest. And because the limit will be set at an arbitrary point, it
will simply shift the problem of horizontal inequity from a line drawn between
those who pay support and those who do not in a tax system with no deduction
permitted, to a new line drawn between those who pay less than the limit as
support and those who pay more in a system where a limited deduction is
possible.
As mentioned earlier, provisions designed to partially transfer tax liability
from the support payor to the recipient by giving the payor a tax credit for the
amount of tax paid by the recipient on the support payment were utilized from
1942 until 1944 in Canada. Such a scheme does provide some relief for some
transferors but none is provided in those cases in which it is most needed, that
is, where the transferor and recipient have low incomes and the recipient pays
no taxes or pays a minimum tax. These provisions also fail to provide any real
government subsidy because the tax burden on the pre-transfer total income is
not changed but is merely divided unevenly between the parties.
Where the government wants to subsidize a specific type of expenditure
by a taxpayer, a subsidy in the form of a tax credit can provide direct relief
while still affording the government an acceptable degree of control over its
expenditures and eliminating the upside-down effect of deductions. This is ac-
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complished by carefully drafting restrictions on the type of expenditures for
which credit will be given and then imposing a limit on the credit to control the
amount of the subsidy to any particular taxpayer. A refundable credit extends
the subsidy to persons who pay no taxes, if they file returns. If a tax credit
were used to direct the government subsidy for income transfers in the form of
support payments, a limit would not be feasible because the government would
not be able to set a reasonable maximum amount and any arbitrary cut-off
point would unfairly discriminate against some taxpayers.
Unlike a deduction, a credit does not refund a greater portion of each
dollar of subsidized expenditures of higher bracket taxpayers than of lower
bracket taxpayers. However, a credit equally available to all taxpayers would
be undesirable in light of the consumption element of support payments. It
does not make sense to subsidize the wealthiest taxpayers to the same extent as
the poorest because this consumption imposes less of a burden as income in-
creases.
Any solution to the problems outlined above must satisfy two re-
quirements: 1) it should recognize the consumption element of support
payments and provide a lower subsidy per dollar transferred for higher income
taxpayers; and 2) it should acknowledge that one of the goals of the subsidy
programme is to recognize, in part, a taxpayer's loss of economic power over
amounts paid as support so that the taxpayer who transfers a higher propor-
tion of his or her income than another taxpayer in the same income bracket
will receive a greater subsidy (but still less on a per dollar basis than the poorer
taxpayer). These goals could be accomplished through the use of an ap-
propriate disappearing credit or disappearing deduction mechanism. Because
of the popular perception of a credit as a subsidy and the probable public
resistance to a subsidy for divorce or separation, a deduction is a more viable
alternative politically, especially if framed as a modification of the present
provisions.
A number of alternative models are possible. The one presented here is
designed to achieve the two goals described above while using the taxpayer's
portion of his or her income paid as support as a yardstick for measuring the
burden of a transfer.m2- To calculate the modified deduction, the taxpayer
2 The ratio of support payments to total taxable income is only a rough measure-
ment of the relative burden on a taxpayer of any given transfer and may be more or less
inaccurate in specific cases. For example, a taxpayer with $10,000 worth of taxable
capital gains has $20,000 of income available from which support payments could be
made. While capital gains may be taxed in the hands of the recipient at a preferential
rate for any number of reasons, it has the same economic power as fully-taxed earned
income. The formula used to tax these amounts preferentially excludes a portion of the
capital gains from taxable income. This distorts the ability-to-pay calculation used to
determine the proposed support payment deduction because the real income available
for making support payments is not taken into account. It may be desirable, therefore,
to require a gross-up of these amounts for the purpose of calculating the support pay-
ment deduction.
An interesting look at the reverse side of this coin is to be found in Lewis and Max-
well, Capital Gain as BasisforAlimony and Non-Support Awards (1954), 16 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 1 where the authors claimed the alimony formula contained in the Pennsylvania
divorce law in effect at that time was based on a definition of income that was much
narrower than that used for federal income tax purposes. Thus they argued that capital
gains were not "income" available for support payments under Pennsylvania law.
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would subtract from taxable income the fraction of the support equal to the
portion of taxable income that is transferred as support. For example, a tax-
payer earning $10,000 a year and paying $5,000 in support payments could
deduct fifty percent of the payment, or $2,500, from income while the same
taxpayer paying $1,000 in support payments could deduct ten percent of the
payment, or $100. To increase the subsidy the deduction fraction can be
altered by any amount while retaining its proportional effect. For example, the
deduction could be two times the fraction, or 100 percent and twenty percent
respectively in the above examples. In the table below the proposed deduction
has been labelled a "modified deduction," and the more generous proposed
deduction (calculated as two times the ratio of support payments to available
income) an "enriched modified deduction."
TABLE 1
PRESENT AND PROPOSED SUBSIDIES FOR DISSOLVED FAMILIES
SPLITTING INCOME VIA SUPPORT PAYMENTS224
Earner's Taxable
Income 10,000 10,000 30,000 30,000 30,000
Support Payment 5,000 1,000 15,000 5,000 1,000
Support as a % of
Taxable Income 50% 10% 50% 16% 3%
Tax Subsidy from
Present Deduction 931 190 1,918 1,248 248
Tax Subsidy from
Modified Deduc-
tion 475 10 340 198 8
Tax Subsidy from
Enriched Modi-
fied Deduction 931 38 1,918 398 13
224 Calculations are based on tax rates applicable to the 1982 tax year. The figures
refer to federal income taxes only. The tax subsidy is calculated as the difference be-
tween tax liability were no deduction allowed the payor and the support payments not
taxed in the hands of the recipient, and the combined tax liabilities of the payor and
recipient if the payor is allowed a full or modified deduction for any support paid and
the support amounts were treated as taxable income to the recipient. When calculating
the tax subsidy for the modified and enriched modified deductions, it is assumed that
the entire support payment (less those deductions described below) will be taxable to the
recipient even where the payor may be allowed a partial deduction only. For the purpose
of calculating the payor's tax liability were no deduction permitted, taxable income is
assumed to be the amount left after deductions, excluding support payments but in-
cluding the deduction for a dependent spouse. In calculating the payor's tax liability, if
a deduction for support payments were permitted, the support deduction would be
lowered by the lost spousal deduction. For the purpose of calculating the tax liability of
the recipient, a standard medical/charitable deduction and a standard personal exemp-
tion has been deducted from the receipt. The modified deduction is calculated as
follows for the five examples, from left to right: first taxpayer - fifty percent of the
support payment; second taxpayer - ten percent of the support payment; third tax-
payer - fifty percent of the support payment; fourth taxpayer - sixteen percent of
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The effects of the modified support payments deduction can be illustrated
by comparing the subsidies provided under the present scheme to those under
the proposed formula. An enriched version of the modified deduction shows
the effects of the formula when it is adjusted to preserve the present level of
subsidy for families splitting available income. The problems with the present
subsidy are readily apparent. The total government subsidy for the income
transfer in the family where the earner making $10,000 gives away $5,000, or
half her income, is $931. The family where the earner makes three times as
much, $30,000, but still transfers only $5,000, receives a total subsidy of
$1,248 for the same amount transferred. The effects of the subsidy are even
more skewed when smaller portions of income are transferred. When the reci-
pient receives only $1,000 from the available income, the government subsidy
is $190 for the $10,000 family and $248 for the $30,000 family.
Under the modified deduction, the lower income family transferring the
same amount as the higher income family receives a greater subsidy, not a
lesser. The enriched modified deduction can be used to maintain the vertical
differentiation of the modified deduction (lower brackets receive higher sub-
sidies for the same income transfer) while treating the concern about loss of
economic power over the transferred money as more important than that
about fairly taxing the consumption element of support payments. If the con-
cern of horizontal equity is primarily to recognize the consumption element of
the transfer, the modified deduction is preferable, whereas the enriched
modified deduction should be used if the concern over loss of economic power
is an important motivation for the subsidy.
5. Achieving Temporal Equity with the Tax Expenditure
Before any changes are made to the existing provisions dealing with sup-
port payments, the problem of temporal equity must be addressed. When in-
come tax amendments alter the tax liabilities of persons who have entered into
agreements on the basis of existing law, one or both of the parties to the pre-
existing agreements will bear an unanticipated burden or enjoy an unexpected
relief. 225 On the two previous occasions in which major changes to the tax
treatment of support payments were enacted, in 1942 and 1944, no transition
measures were implemented to cover persons who had entered into agreements
on the basis of prior law. Both the 1942 and 1944 amendments altered the
relative positions of payors and recipients who had negotiated in the expecta-
tion that the tax treatment accorded support payments prior to the changes
would continue. The changes did not have a dramatic effect on persons whose
the support payment; fifth taxpayer - three percent of the support payment. The
enriched modified deduction is two times the modified deduction, that is, 100 percent of
the support payment for the first taxpayer; twenty percent of the support payment for
the second taxpayer, and so on.
In each case the recipient is assumed to have no other income. If he or she does have
other income, the results illustrated will apply if the support is considered to be the
"first" income of the recipient. Relief might be considered for recipients with other in-
come who would find the non-support income taxed at their highest margihal rate under
the proposed subsidy mechanism, while it would be taxed as their only income were no
transfer of tax liability for support payments permitted (as was the case in the orthodox
pre-1942 situation).
225 The myriad of temporal equity concerns that arise in the case of income tax
changes are discussed in Bale, Temporal Equity in Taxation (1977), 55 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
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support obligation predated the large tax increases of the war period since the
amendments often returned them to the after-tax, after-support positions they
enjoyed before the war. Persons receiving support payments that had been
negotiated or awarded prior to the changes were dramatically affected,
however, and suddenly found the amounts they had received as after-tax in-
come were subject to high war-time tax rates. 226
In the case of tax measures affecting individuals, temporal equity can be
achieved by permitting taxpayers who had organized their affairs in anticipa-
tion of the past tax law a transitional period in which they can reorganize in
light of the altered law. This is not possible where the provisions affect
agreements between two persons where one party might prefer the conse-
quences of the tax changes on the existing agreement. Where support
payments are made pursuant to a court order and not private agreement, it is
possible to petition the court for a modification of the terms of the order if cir-
cumstances change. 227 However, such a route is complicated and would lead to
a bureaucratic nightmare if all persons with existing court ordered obligations
sought changes to those orders at the same time, following a change in taxa-
tion of support payments.
Any amendment of the taxation of support payments should apply only
to obligations commencing after the new provisions come into effect. The
changes should be introduced some time before the date on which they will
become law so that persons negotiating agreements that would begin after the
new provisions are in force could do so with the knowledge of the tax conse-
quences they will face. 228
IV. CONCLUSION
Income connotes many different concepts in a number of diverse con-
texts. The preferable way to arrive at an appropriate construction for the pur-
poses of an income tax base is to commence by accepting the desirability of a
progressive taxation system. Income must be construed in a manner that will
further the aims of a graduated income tax. Only after this is done will it be
possible to apply the analysis to a particular situation or provision and deter-
mine its appropriate treatment in a normative tax system.
226 If the effect of the deduction were too generous and the payor ended up in
almost the same position he was in prior to the war, the provisions would have been
quite unfair. High war time taxes were designed to reduce personal consumption and
divert resources to the government to devote to war purposes. Ideally the reduction in
consumption should have been distributed between the payor and recipient. See supra,
note 105.
227See, e.g., Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, s. 11(2) and Family Law Reform
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, s. 21(1).228 In 1954 Congress expanded and liberalized the American deduction provision.
For example, a deduction for payments made pursuant to a separation agreement where
there was no court decree was allowed for the first time (see text accompanying notes
197 and 198, supra). At that time Congress was aware of the unfairness which would
result if the new law were applied to prior agreements, especially if a recipient had
agreed to an amount on the assumption that it would continue to be non-taxable. Ac-
cordingly, the new provision applied only to agreements entered into after the change
was implemented. See Horne, supra note 125, at 752-53; S. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
at 10-11 (1954).
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The Haig-Simons definition of income is generally conceded to be a
reasonable place to commence an inquiry into the meaning to be accorded that
term for the purposes of a benchmark income tax system. This definition
states that income comprises two elements: consumption and savings. Con-
troversy revolves around the question of which deductions are appropriate for
refining the measurement of income and which are deviations from the nor-
mative tax base. This issue is discussed from two distinct perspectives. On one
level, commentators disagree as to whether it is reasonable to treat involuntary
expenditures in the same fashion as voluntary disbursements. It is generally
conceded that the term consumption embraces both these forms of expen-
diture and the issue is whether all types of consumption should be treated
similarly.
A separate question to be resolved is whether consumption is synonymous
with appropriation of goods or services, or whether it contains two elements,
actual physical consumption and potential consumption, which is understood
to mean economic power that could have been used in the marketplace but in-
stead was transferred to another taxpayer.
The choice of definition will turn on the purposes one attributes to a pro-
gressive tax system. A narrow view of consumption is appropriate if one views
the income tax system as a means for redistributing pieces of the social goods
and services pie. At the same time, if one believes that an aim of a progressive
income tax is to redistribute economic power, that is, the ability to cut the pie
in the first place and then allocate the pieces, one should commence with a
definition of income that will include all accretions in economic power, not only
the utilization of that power. Of the alternative accretion tax bases available,
only income has the potential to accomplish this end and this is the reason we
have adopted and retained a progressive income tax system. The quality that a
progressive income tax system seeks to tax is accretions in control over
economic potential, not utilization of that potential.
If the progressive income tax system is to accomplish its non-fiscal ends, it
must reduce the disparities among taxpayers in their ability to exercise control
over the distribution of market commodities and services. The control may be
utilized to directly appropriate from the market or to affect the distribution of
goods and services by permitting someone else to use the power. For this
reason the Canadian income tax system measures a taxpayer's income without
taking into account the identity of the person who finally used the economic
power it entailed. There is no more reason to relieve a taxpayer of liability for
taxes on amounts given away than on amounts saved or exchanged for pro-
duce. If one starts with the premise that a person's marginal tax rates should
be based on the economic potential they command and not the application of
that potential, it follows that neither purchases intended for the personal con-
sumption of the taxpayer nor transfers to others should be relieved of taxation
in the earner's hands. This is equally true for a one-time transfer of a portion
of a taxpayer's income and an assignment of all that person's income for an in-
definite period.
The development of a continuing support obligation as an incident of cer-
tain relationships is a unique phenomenon not directly analogous to other
property or contractual or gratuitous income transfers. While it is not easy to
identify the underlying nature of the obligation, its appropriate treatment in a
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normative income tax system is not difficult to determine. If one applies the
comprehensive Haig-Simons income definitions, as established above, it is
clear that there are no tax policy grounds for relieving the payor from taxation
on the transferred amounts. Because no deduction would be allowed the payor
for these transfers under a normative income tax system, the present deduction
allowed the payor, along with the subsequent inclusion of these amounts in the
recipient's taxable income, where they will be subject to a lower marginal rate
of taxation, operates as a subsidy toward the cost of these income transfers.
It is true that support payments are more difficult to fit into the mold of
income over which the payor voluntarily relinquished control than many other
income transfers. Furthermore, the government might wish to subsidize those
family units that support two households on an income that formerly sup-
ported one. Both these concerns can be addressed through the income tax
treatment of support payments. However, the appropriate treatment of these
transfers cannot be established unless the subsidy nature of the existing provi-
sions and any proposed modification of them is recognized. If the taxation of
support is to contain a subsidy, the aid should be distributed in a manner that
treats dissolved families with differing amounts of total income available for
splitting and dissolved families making different divisions of available income
in an equitable fashion relative to each other and to those families which re-
main intact and ineligible for the subsidy.
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